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INTRODUCTION
State and local taxation of nonprofit organizations raises interesting
conceptual issues regarding the relationship between government and the
nonprofit sector. Traditionally, government and nonprofits have worked
together with the understanding that the former would grant tax
exemptions to the latter as a matter of social policy. Granting property
tax exemptions, corporate income tax exemptions, and sales tax
exemptions are all options the government exercises in an effort to
maintain the plurality of services that can only be provided to society

Copyright © 1993, Rebecca S. Rudnick.
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with the help of the nonprofit sector.' But according to The Nonprofit
Policy Agenda, a comprehensive survey conducted by the associates of
the Union Institute, the traditional relationship between nonprofits and
government has been altered by government's need to expand its own
revenue sources, which has had a direct impact on the tax status of the
nonprofit sector.2

Operating under the assumption that nonprofit organizations provide
society with valuable services it could not obtain elsewhere, the Union
Institute devoted a section of The Nonprofit Policy Agenda to an

analysis of the ways in which taxation affects the nonprofit sector's
ability efficiently to provide those services. The five recommendations
of the Institute, which pertain directly to state and local taxation, are
provocative in scope. They attempt to untangle the confusion of
governmental taxation policy toward nonprofits and recommend several
actions that government might take to make its tax policy towards
nonprofit enterprises more appropriate, if not revenue-conscious.
This article analyzes some of the issues raised by the complex
relationship of nonprofits to state and local taxes, taking as a point of
departure the directives set forth in The Nonprofit Policy Agenda.
Using second-best analysis,3 it will critically evaluate the Union

1. The term nonprofit sector "posits a single characteristic-tax exempt
status under the federal tax code as criterion for inclusion in the sector." PETER
DOBKIN HALL, INVENTING THE NONPROFIT SECTOR AND OTHER ESSAYS

ON
See
also ESTELLE JAMES, THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1989);
ESTELLE JAMES & SUSAN ROSE A CKERMAN, THE NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE IN MARKET
ECONOMICS (1986).
2. The Union Institute is a university incorporated in Ohio as an
independent, nonprofit institution of higher education. Its research and analysis
PHILANTHROPY, VOLUNTARISM, AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 244 (1992).

section is the Center for Public Policy. The Union Institute published The
Nonprofit Policy Agenda to draw attention to the government's role in controlling
the nonprofit sector and to caution against regulation that is too restrictive. It
argues that it is the government's responsibility to see that the nonprofit sector
be given ample opportunity to offer its services to society. The study is
conducted under the assumption that nonprofits do provide valuable services to
society. DEBORAH KOCH, THE UNION INSTITUTE, THE NONPROFIT POLICY AGENDA:
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATE AND LOCALACTION 87 (1992).
3. Second best analysis aims to define optimal policies to cope with
distortions and inefficiencies in the marketplace. The theory asserts that the
general guidelines for policy provided by welfare economics are not relevant for
real-world economics, which are likely to reflect constraints on policy and market
distortions. That is, once the world departs from perfect competition, it is unclear
whether a policy change one way or the other will be more desirable. See R.G.
Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24 REV. ECON.

(continued)
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Institute's recommendations for altering current governmental approaches
to the nonprofit sector. It will suggest that a distinction should be made
or maintained between commercial nonprofits and charitable nonprofits,
given that the latter provide services the government would otherwise
be forced to provide itself. Furthermore, this article will propose that
governments should discriminate between the commercial and charitable
activities of those nonprofits that undertake both.
I. THE RISE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
In the realm of public services, the nonprofit organization has been
entrusted with the execution of some of the primary tasks of government.
At one point in this government's history, the charitable and
philanthropic sector was funded solely by private organizations and
individuals received donations only through private contributions.
Today, however, government has become the most important source of
income for most types of nonprofits, providing twice the resources of
private contributions. 4 Nonprofits have come to include much more than
the traditional charitable organizations. Additionally, the extent of
government support has grown by leaps and bounds, a significant portion
of which has come in the form of tax relief. At the same time, the
nonprofit community argues that it bears many "hidden taxes," such as
utilities taxes, taxes on motor fuels, surcharges on business taxes, taxes on
real estate transactions, and miscellaneous taxes including tax on
insurance and alcoholic beverages.5
Tax relief is not considered unqualified, altruistic support for
nonprofit organizations. Rather, tax relief is perceived as a government
subsidy. Under this conception, government provides the subsidy to the
particular nonprofit because it offers services to the community that
government would offer, if it could do so effectively. 6 Some commentators
have questioned the efficacy and appropriateness of using the tax system
STUD. 11 (1956-57); see also Peter Bohm, Second Best, in 4 NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS

280 (John Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).

4. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of
Government-Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK 99 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987); see also JOHN H. FILER, THE FILER
COMMISSION R EPORT (REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND
PUBLIC NEEDS), reprinted in part in THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL
READINGS 70 (David L. Gies et al. eds., 1990).
5. See HARRIET BOGRAD, HIDDEN TAXES ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS IN
NEW YORK (Nonprofit Coordinating Committee Working Paper, Mar. 4, 1993).

6. See John G. Simon, The Tax Treatment of Nonprofit Organizations: A
Review of Federal and State Policies, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 67, 76; see also FILER, supra note 4.
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to subsidize the nonprofit sector. Others conclude, however, that the tax
system is an efficient point at which to locate the subsidy as it "permits
7
decentralized decision-making through individual taxpayer choice."
Congress has decided to subsidize nonprofit organizations by
providing them with tax exemptions, thus encouraging certain desired
behavior. The implicit intent of Congress, therefore, may have been to
provide nonprofits with certain competitive advantages.' This is,
however, an oversimplified view of the legislative process. It assumes
that but for government involvement with and preferential treatment of
nonprofits, these organizations would not exist in sufficient numbers. It is
assumed that nonprofits exist and are socially preferred because they are
more efficient than their for-profit counterparts. But the overwhelming
weight of the evidence does not exist to support this contention. 9 In fact,
one commentator has noted that "[iut is fair to say that serious attempts
to detect the social rationale for encouraging nonprofits in particular
areas of economic activity have been scant and indecisive, at least in
industries other than health care." 0
7. Simon, supra note 6, at 78.
8.

BURTQN WEISBROD, THE NONPROFIT ECONOMY 123 (1988).

One

commentator maintains that a subsidy made by exemption should be a limited
subsidy and can be justified only if the activity supported is one which the
government would have to perform if the nonprofit did not. in evaluating the
exemptions for nonprofit institutions, the important questions are as follows: (1)
Is the activity one whose local government costs should be subsidized; (2) To
what extent should they be subsidized; and (3) Who should bear the cost of the
subsidy? C.K. COBB, JR., PROPERTY TAX ExEMPTIONS FOR NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS,
reprinted in OLIVEROLDMAN & FERDINAND P. SCHOETTLE, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES
AND FINANCE 330-32 (1974).
9. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 123.
10. Id. at 124. According to Falcone and Warren, the health care arena is
the best area in which to define the conflict between nonprofit organizations and
for-profit organizations. They argue that nonprofit hospitals should be seen as a
preferred means of giving equal access care without large direct federal
subsidies. David Falcone & David G. Warren, The Shadow Price of Pluralism:
The Use of Tax Expenditures to Subsidize Hospital Care in the United States, 13
J. H EALTH PoL POL'Y & L. 735, 739 (1988). Arrington and Haddock concur, saying
that nonprofit hospitals have a higher rate of return in terms of social benefits
than for-profit hospitals. Barbara Arrington & Cynthia C. Haddock, Who Really
Profits from Not-for-Profits?, 25 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 291, 303 (1990). Herzlinger
and Krasker present a dissenting view, saying that nonprofit hospitals do not live
up to their social promise because, overall, they do not give greater social benefit
than for-profits. Regina E. Herzlinger & William S. Krasker, Who Profits from
Nonprofits?, 65 HARV. Bus. REV. 93; see also Cyril F. Chang & Howard P.
Tuckman, The Profits of Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 13 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 547
(1988).
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Many scholars accept the proposal known as the "public goods
theory."" Under this doctrine, nonprofits fill gaps in the market when
12
private producers fail to allocate goods and services efficiently.
Government can and does play a major role in regulating market forces,
but the political and legal constraints on government make it an
imperfect provider of collective goods; it tends to meet the demands of
the majority, leaving demands of some minority groups unsatisfied. The
public goods theory posits that nonprofits, such as the American Heart
Association and the March of Dimes, serve specific communities where
the government is unable to provide enough support. "Because nonprofits
are free of this political constraint, they may complement government's
13
activities to overcome limitations of the private enterprise.'
The fact that nonprofits often produce purely private goods renders
the public goods theory questionable. Scholars have therefore
developed an alternative theory which holds that nonprofits step in
when commercial enterprises fail to live up to their "contract." The
consumer feels safer patronizing a nonprofit, which has no reason to
economize and therefore no reason to cheat the consumer in the interest of
higher profits. For instance, if the public fears that a for-profit day care
center is overcharging or economizing on service and the day care loses
the confidence of its clients, a nonprofit might be able to hold that
confidence more effectively. The nonprofit thus is viewed as a more
trustworthy organization because its primary function is not the pursuit of
profit. The nonprofit therefore enjoys a competitive advantage among
4
consumers who sense this difference.
The altruism theory of tax exemption provides yet a third
alternative for understanding favorable tax treatment of nonprofits. It
combines primary benefits, metabenefits, and the prohibition on private
inurement in a different way. 5 The altruism theory is based on the idea
11.

Henry Hansmann, Economic Theories of Nonprofit Organization,in
A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 28-29.

THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:

12. Id.
13. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 163 (concentrating on demand as the reason
for the rise of the voluntary sector); see also Hansmann, supra note 11, at 29.
14. Hansmann, supra note 11, at 29-30.

15. For a summary of these concepts, see Rob Atkinson, Altruism in
Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990). The altruism theory
synthesizes the traditional subsidy theory and the technical definition theory.
According to Atkinson, the traditional subsidy theory views nonprofits as
providing two types of benefits-primary public benefits and "metabenefits."
Primary public benefits are inherent in an organization's activities. They can be
goods or services which are inherently good, or they can be ordinary goods and
services provided to the needy. Metabenefits do not concern any specific
product, but instead derive from how a product is distributed or produced. This
(continued)
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that nonprofits are given a preference (favorable tax treatment) because
of the primary and metabenefits they provide. 16 The theory advances
the idea that tax-exempt status for nonprofit organizations is not truly
necessary, but instead represents a social policy choice that must be made
on grounds other than efficiency. 17 Under this theory, the metabenefit of
an organization's altruistic production is sufficient to exempt the
organization's income, without inquiring into the public benefits to be
derived from it.'8
Tax exemptions give nonprofits a competitive advantage over forprofit organizations. Thus, it is probable that tax exemption influences
the overall pace of nonprofit development. 9 The pattern of nonprofit
development demonstrates that the availability of a tax exemption is
not determinative of whether a given activity will be organized in
traditional nonprofit fields.2 Yet, distortions in investment choices occur
where capital income in various industries is taxed at different rates
within the corporate sector, and when tax provisions such
as depreciation
21
rules are more favorable to one industry than to another.
The Internal Revenue Service cannot deny a nonprofit entry into the
market on the basis that too much competition already exists. Similarly,
it cannot encourage organizations to enter into the nonprofit sector, even if
such increased activity is deemed desirable. 22 Perhaps government could
theory allows the government to encourage organizations to provide goods, thus
promoting public welfare through charitable exemption. Id. at 605. The
technical definition theory extends tax exemption to all forms of public service
organizations. This theory rests on the notion that defining such organizations'
income and their placement within a tax bracket is inherently difficult. Id. at 61012.
16. Id. at 618.
17. Id. at 619.
18. Id.
19. See Henry B. Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other
Factors on the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms,40NAVLTAX J.
71, 79 (1987).

The higher the level of a state's taxation of private business, the

greater the competitive value a nonprofit receives by the exemption from those
taxes. Thus, in states that have higher property tax, sales tax, and corporate
income tax rates, nonprofit organizations receive a greater subsidy than do
nonprofits in states with lower tax rates. Exemption from property taxation gives
nonprofits a particular incentive to locate in city centers, where property tax rates
are usually high. Id. at 77.
20. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835,
882(1980).
21. RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PuBuc FINANCE N THEORY
ANDPRACrICE 283 (5th ed. 1989).
22. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 161. Nonprofit firms compete with one
another in the markets for donations, memberships, and sales.

See Julian

(continued)
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indirectly improve the overall market performance affecting the
nonprofit sector by employing tax and regulatory levers to control
excessive or inadequate competition. It is not clear exactly how nonprofit
firms decide whether to utilize cost and revenue advantages to increase
their market share, or to build market size or corporate emoluments. In
for other disadvantages, such
some cases, advantages merely compensate
23
as lack of access to financial capital.
The justification for a broad exemption policy may rest on the
underlying assumption that, "any measure that expands the domain of
one form of institution affects all other forms. 24 This is so because of the
interdependent nature of the institutions that comprise the nonprofit
sector. Accordingly, "there can be no such thing as sound public policy
toward nonprofits-because policy can be wisely constructed only if it
recognizes the ways that nonprofits interact with other elements of the
economic system."5
A free market will always misallocate a few commodities, such as
public goods, even without the pressure of tax induced distortions. 26 Thus,
economic welfare in general will suffer unless public policy can be used to
correct the situation. 27 Efficiency alone may justify using tax exemptions
to subsidize nonprofits. 2 In terms of allocation of capital, distortions
Wolpert & Thomas Reiner, The Not-For-Profit Sector in Stable and Growing
Metropolitan Regions, 20 URB. AFF. Q. 487 (1985). Wolpert and Reiner provide a
regional focus on not-for-profit organizations, arguing that such a limited focus
leads to a better understanding of the nonprofit sector.
The nonprofit sector competes with for-profit and government sectors in
markets for skilled labor, sales, and reduced (or zero) cost service provision. See
Richard Steinberg, Nonprofit Organizations and the Market, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR: A RESEARCH HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 118-19; see also Eugene F. Fama

& Michael C. Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims, 26 J.L. & EcON. 327
(1983).
23. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 119, 133.
24. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 160.
25. Id; see also Lee Clarke & Carroll L. Estes, Sociological and Economic
Theories of Markets and Nonprofits: Evidence from Home Health
Organizations,97 AM. J. Soc. 945 (1992) (discussing the differences between forprofits and nonprofits in terms of the modes of each entity, either as a specialist
or a generalist).
26. Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax-Induced Distortions in the Voluntary Sector,
39 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 663, 666 (1988) (Welfarist models of tax optimization
evaluate tax efficiency in terms of ante- and post-tax distribution of resources,
income, or prices: "[dlistortions arise when taxes change the ratio of prices away
from the value that would exist in absence of taxation."); see MARTIN FELDSTEIN,
THE SECOND BEST THEORY OF DIFFERENTIAL C APITAL TAXATION 2-4 & n.4 (1985).
27. Clotfelter, supra note 26, at 666.
28. Id.
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may appear in some sectors due to the possible "x-inefficiency" of
nonprofits. 2 Due to the preferential treatment of nonprofits, the overall
efficiency of some markets may be impaired. Nonprofit equity itself may
also be inefficient, 30 although the evidence is mixed. 31 While distortions
exist, even economists critical of nonprofits maintain that a full-scale32
dismantling of the tax provisions that sustain nonprofits is not justified.
Exemptions and deductions are supported by the most basic models of
welfare economics.33 If these tax provisions would be eliminated, an
immediate concern would arise that society will no longer allocate
enough time and resources to such altruistic activities. 34 Otherwise,
when the public benefit is not a factor, the exemption of nonprofits in a
market where nonprofits and for-profits perform alternate activities
appears distortionary, raising problems of horizontal equity.35
Most of the aforementioned models have as a prerequisite economic
efficiency, as discussed above, and horizontal equity. The equity
principle is perceived as the before-tax and after-tax distributional
status quo. Alternatively, some authors regard the status quo as a result
of an intrinsically justified process.36
Currently, powerful forces are leading the voluntary sector away
from its role as a partner in public service. Rather than leading the
sector toward a more charitable mode of operation, nonprofits instead are
tending to move toward greater integration into the private market

29. Id. at 692. The theory of "x-inefficiency" suggests that business entities
constrained by vigorous competition have lower production costs than
businesses in an industry with little or no competition. Harvey Leibenstein,
Allocative Efficiency vs. "x-Efficiency," 56 AM. ECON. REV. 392 (1966).
30. See Howard P. Tuckman & Cyril F. Chang, Nonprofit Equity: A
Behavioral Model and Its Policy Implications, 11 J. POL'Y ANAL. MGMT. 76 (1992)
(noting that nonprofit decision-makers have an incentive to earn and
accumulate surpluses of equity yet government does not perceive this as the
accumulation of profit, because it is assumed that this surplus will go towards
their social mission).
31. See Edwin G. West, Nonprofit Organizations: Revised Theory and New
Evidence, 63 PUB. CHOICE 165 (1989); see also Dennis Zimmerman, Nonprofit
Organizations, Social Benefits, and Tax Policy, 44 NAY'LTAxJ. 341 (1991).
32. See, e.g., Clotfelter, supra note 26, at 693.

33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle,
42 NArL TAX J. 139, 147 (1989). These alternative models regard horizontal equity
as generally outside the social framework, a by-product of the optimization
process.
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economy. 37 The notion of the voluntary sector as a last line of defense in
cases of "market failure" and "government failure" takes too little
account of the inherent strengths and weaknesses of the voluntary sector,
particularly the sector's exceptional capabilities as a deliverer of human
services. Furthermore, such a notion ignores the inherent difficulties in
raising resources and ensuring uniformity of coverage.3
Major changes will likely alter the character of the voluntary sector
in fundamental ways. Among the most likely changes, the traditional
partnership between government and the nonprofit sector will be removed
from its place as the central organizing principle. Additional
modifications will include resource constraints, reorganization in the
composition of welfare spending, a move from producer subsidies to
consumer subsidies, demographic developments, and a shift from cultural
to economic explanations of poverty.39
In general, however, with respect to fulfilling society's needs, some
sort of alliance between government and the nonprofit sector must be
maintained because "the voluntary sector's weaknesses correspond well
with government's strengths, and vice versa."'4 Given the likelihood
that the relationship between government and the nonprofit sector will
remain fluid, questions of taxation and tax exemption take on a new
importance. Several underlying questions remain, such as whether state
and local economic development policies will affect the growth in a
particular area, or simply how the taxation or tax exemptions will play
out. 41 In order to ensure that society's needs are met, the status of
nonprofit organizations in general and their status with respect to tax
exemption in particular must continually be analyzed.

37. Lester M. Salamon, The Changing Partnership Between the Voluntary
Sector and the Welfare State, in THE FUTURE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR:
CHALLENGES, CHANGES, AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 41 (Virginia A. Hodgkinson

et al., eds., 1989).
38. Id. at 44.
39. Id. at 45-50; see also MICHAEL O'NEILL, THE THIRD AMERICA: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN THE UNITED STATES (1989).

40. Lester M. Salamon, Partners in Public Service: The Scope and Theory of
Government-Nonprofit Relations, in THE NONPROFIT SECTOR: A RESEARCH
HANDBOOK, supra note 4, at 99, 113.
41. TIMOTHY J. BARTIK, WHO B ENEFITS FROM STATE AND LOCAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT POLICIES? 58 (1991).
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II. GENERAL RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNION INSTITUTE
To qualify for tax exempt status under Section 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, a nonprofit organization must satisfy
four initial criteria:
First, an organization must be organized and operated
exclusively for one of eight exempt purposes: religious,
charitable, scientific, public safety, literary, educational,
testing, for fostering amateur sports, or preventing cruelty to
children or animals. Second, the organization's net earnings must
not inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.
Third, an organization must not engage in substantial political
activity. Fourth, the organization must not engage in activities
42
violative of established public policy.
In 1985, 366,000 out of a total of 887,000 nonprofit organizations were
considered tax exempt under the conditions elucidated in Section
501(c)(3). 43 In 1987, 390,668 organizations enjoyed exemption, while in
1989, 460,289 such organizations were deemed exempt." The increase
4
from 1987 to 1989 is consistent with the growth in all major code areas. 5
Since World War II, the nonprofit sector of our economy has doubled, from
two percent to four percent of the gross national income."
This enormous growth cannot solely be attributed to an automatic
grant of governmental special treatment to nonprofits. 47 Governments
have sounded a broad retreat from favoring the nonprofit organization.
Several factors illustrate this curtailment. First, governments have
completely withdrawn exemption in certain areas. 48 Second, tax laws
distinguish between the charitable and commercial activities of
42. Trevor A. Brown, Religious Nonprofits and the Commercial Manner
Test, 99 YALE L.J. 1631, 1632 (1990) (referring to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1986)); see also
Bruce R. Hopkins, T HE LAW OF TAX -ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3-29 (6th ed. 1990).
43. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 169.
44. See INDEPENDENT SECTOR STAFF, THE NONPROFIT ALMANAC 1992-1993 193
(Virginia Ann Hodgkinson et al. eds., 4th ed. 1993). Table 5.8 indicates that there
were 133, 336 § 501(c)(4) organizations. Id. at 201.
45. Id. at 196.
46. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at vii.
47. Henry Hansmann, The Evolving Law of Nonprofit Organizations: Do
Current Trends Make Good Policy?, 39 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 807, 818 (1989).
48. Id. at 817. For example, the 1983 Social Security Act made Social
Security taxes mandatory for nonprofits, whereas in the past these taxes had
been voluntary. Id.
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nonprofits. 49 Third, tax laws have begun to differentiate among the
various types of nonprofit organizations, taking away exemptions from
organizations that governments deem unworthy. In some cases,
organizations have been given exempt status, whereas other
organizations that undertake similar activity have not been granted a
tax exemption. 0 The problem at the federal level is often exacerbated by
the vast array of local and state government approaches to the question
of who deserves exemption. Henry Hansmann addresses this problem,
suggesting that in fiscal law there is a good case for discriminating among
nonprofits with respect to the functions they serve. Specifically, he
recommends that exemptions to truly charitable organizations should
only be given at the federal level. However, he suggests that the use of
the federal income tax system to regulate discriminatory standards for
nonprofit organizations may actually be a means of constitutionalizing
the tax system, eliminating the distortions that occur when a variety of
5
standards are used at the local and state level. '
Many problems also exist at the state level, where criteria for
determining charity-exempt status are not as clearly defined as they are
in the Internal Revenue Code. The Model Nonprofit Corporation Act of
1964 remains the prevailing law in most states, but it allows for a wide
variety of standards. As a result, the Act was revised and adopted by
the American Bar Association in 1987, to which many states reacted
favorably by adopting its revisions. 5 2 While all states require that a
charitable organization produce no personal or private financial gain,
state policies vary on other criteria for charitable status. The Nonprofit
Policy Agenda argues that this lack of a consistent policy impedes the
process of determining whether an organization should be considered
charitable and therefore tax exempt. To remedy the situation, the
Institute makes the first of its taxation recommendations: "State
governments should adopt consistent rules governing the determination of
53
charitableness for property tax and other exemption purposes.
This general recommendation, if applied, might serve as the first
step in a more rational use of the tax exemption as a subsidy to
organizations that benefit their constituencies. However, many
corrupting factors may be present. In addition to the fact that the use of
charitableness as a criteria for tax exemption has a common law origin54
and that the eligibility of nonprofits for tax exemption is by necessity
49. Id. at 817-18.

50. Id.
51. See Steinberg, supra note 22, at 118.
52.

53.

REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION ACT (1988).
KOCH, supra note 2, at 89 (Recommendation 46).

54. See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983).
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highly fact specific, federalism means that the definition of
"charitableness" will by necessity be determined on a state-by-state
basis.-s Federalism preserves the independence of the states in
establishing and implementing basic policies such as tax exemption, the
criteria for which cannot so readily be made uniform as the corporate
rules for conduct of nonprofits. To say the least, the Union Institute
consistency recommendation is ambiguous. Moreover, it is unclear exactly
what the Institute proposes should be made consistent. Does the Institute
suggest consistency among states, or within states? As the following
sections of this article illustrate, consistency within the various taxes

(property, sales, and income) involve resolving basic issues as to the
nature of an organization's activities that should receive tax exemption.
III. PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTION
A. Qualification for Exemption
One writer recently noted that "no other tax varies along so many
significant dimensions" as the property tax. 5 6 If one delineates the
reasons why the property tax is such a complicated revenue source, it
becomes clear why reform of the system has been attempted in so many
ways. First, the tax is actually an amalgam: property taxes consist of
land taxes and structure taxes, which are assessed separately but billed
as one.5 7 Second, the property tax is locally assessed, with rates both
variably determined by law and variably applied in practice. 8 While a
standard approach may exist for the granting of exemptions, every state
has its own particular idiosyncrasies. 59 Finally, the exemptions to which
55. For a critical look at state and local taxes and federalism, see Daniel
Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90

MICH. L.

REv. 895 (1992).
56. James Heilbrun, Who Bears the Burden of the Property Tax?, in
PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL FINANCE

57.

THE

57 (C. Lowell Harriss ed., 1983).

Walter Rybeck, The Property Tax as a Super User Charge, in THE
supra note 56, at 143.
58. Heilbrun, supra note 56, at 58.
59. Texas includes religious, charitable, scientific, literary and educational
purposes in its definition, but then delineates specific acts that each type of
organization must undertake to retain its exempt status. [1 Tex.] St. Tax. Rep.
(CCH) '1 20-142. Furthermore, the organization must be considered nonprofit
according to I.R.C. § 501 (C)(3); its operation must not result in the accrual of
profits or the realization of private gain beyond reasonable salaries, and it must
be defined as a nonprofit according to the Texas Nonprofit Corporation Act.
Court opinions, state legislation, and opinions of the state attorney general have
amended and refined the state's exemption policies. In general, Texas'
(continued)
PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL FINANCE,
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the property tax is subject can be applied accurately or not, at the whim
of the assessor. 60
For most nonprofit entities, exemption from state and local real
property taxes probably provides greater financial significance to the
organization than the exemption from the corporate income tax. 61 The
development of the property tax exemption seems to have mimicked the
growth of nonprofit organizations; the exemption was not a preexisting

approach is consistent with the majority of states. California has established
separate standards for religious, educational, and charitable organizations.
However, the state recognizes a unique standard for its "welfare exemption,"
which follows the Texas approach. [2 Cal.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 20-530. In
California, like Texas (and all states without exception), subsequent practice,
decisions, and amendments have refined the state's exemption policies. Each of
the states has established standards governing exemptions given to charitable
organizations that include some reference to the exempt purpose of the property
(or sales) in question. Louisiana, for instance, has legislated that "none of the
property listed ...shall be exempt if owned, operated, leased, or used for
commercial purposes unrelated to the exempt purposes of the corporation or
association." [2 La.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 90-297. New York has (at least on
paper) addressed one of the problems that arise regarding the property tax
exemption by allowing municipalities to enact local taxes to make up for
revenues lost due to exemptions given to certain organizations (some Bible,
fraternal, historical, and other organizations that are not clearly charitable or
religious in nature). [2 N.Y.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 20-250. Florida recently (1991)
amended its statutes to give the state more freedom to revoke exemptions. The
state can now invoke a "reasonableness" standard when evaluating an
organization: the reasonableness of salaries to employees, charges to clients,
and other payments are now criteria in the granting or repealing of an
exemption. [2 Fla.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 91-336. Washington separates religious
and nonsectarian nonprofits, but within each designation there are requirements
that the organizations "undertake eleemosynary" (for religious organizations) or
"character building" (for the nonsectarian organizations) activities [1 Wash.] St.
Tax. Rep. (CCH) 20-203b, 20-204, 20-204a. The Indiana Code § 6-1.1-10-16(a), as
authorized by the Indiana Constitution, states that "[a]ll or part of a building is
exempt from property taxation if it is owned, occupied, and used by a person for
educational, literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purpose." Id. The court in
Indianapolis Elks Bldg. Corp. v. State Bd. of Tax Comm'rs, 251 N.E.2d 673, 681-83
(Ind.App. 1969), held that these enumerated purposes, as used in the property
tax exemption statute, are to be defined and understood in their broad
constitutional sense, and that for charity, there must be "evidence of relief of
human want ... manifested by obviously charitable acts different from everyday
purposes and activities of man in general." Id.
60. Paul Corusy, Improving the Administration of the Property Tax, in THE
PROPERTY TAX AND LOCALFiNANCE, supra note 56, at 86.

61.

Hansmann, supra note 47, at 882.
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status.62

The property tax exemption affords to
condition of nonprofit
charitable nonprofit organizations a valuable benefit because it reduces
the price of providing a "unit" of charitable services. 63 While
simultaneously acting as a government subsidy, the property tax
exemption makes the cost of the charitable service smaller for the
organization. The amount of the subsidy depends on the local property
tax rate. Nonetheless, given general public hostility to the property tax,
the fact that the subsidy involved is not subject to easy public scrutiny,
and the dangers it poses to the coffers of local governments, there have
been numerous suggestions to make the exemption more rational, more fair
(from the perspective of local government), and more publicly
accountable. Many of the topics discussed below in terms of nonprofits are
already in vogue in a much broader forum.
While states once relied heavily on revenue from property taxes,
today the state property tax is nearly extinct. Municipalities, however,
continue to rely on the property tax for much of their revenue. 64 In 1982,
property taxes represented one percent of states' revenues, whereas thirty
percent of the revenues of local governments nationwide consisted of
monies generated from the property tax. 65 Thus, it is easy to understand
how local efforts to maintain a tax base dependent on property tax
revenues are complicated when a state grants an organization an
exemption. Local government officials have found themselves in a
"Catch-22" situation in which a good portion of their revenue sources is
exempted by the state from taxation.
The burden of assessment lies on the local government. Because
individual governments have unique physical assessment capabilities, a
nonprofit entity exempted from taxes on the state level will benefit to a
62. Id. at 839-40. A sampling of states from each region of the United States
shows that most begin with the basic assumption that charitable nonprofits must
operate in the interests of a sector of society deserving of charity.
63. "A property tax exemption provision that reduces the cost of providing
charitable services by, for example, 10% would be expected to have the same
effect on charitable giving as a 10% reduction in the tax-defined price of giving a
dollar to charity." Charles T. Clotfelter, Tax Incentives and Disincentives for
Charitable Giving, in INDEPENDENT SECTOR, WORKING PAPERS FOR SPRING
RESEARCH FORUM: SINCE THE FILER COMMISSION 347, 358 (1983).

A "unit" of

charitable services is the set amount of services that a donor intends to allocate
his money to provide. The hypothesis suggests that, if the price of providing

those services changes, the donor's charitable giving would change by that same
amount; a change in the price of providing a service leads to a proportional
change in the amount of a donor's contributions. Id.

64. Glenn W. Fisher, Property Taxation and Local Government: Four
Hypotheses,8PRoP.TAXJ. 113,119-20 (1989).

65. Id. at 120.
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different degree in its various assessment jurisdictions." A statewide
assessment system might equalize the effect of state legislation on
nonprofits in several locations within a state. Such a uniform assessment
standard is the ideal to which the system aspires, but as the literature
notes, this standard is impossible to achieve. 67 Courts do not consider the
law, where uniformity is the standard, to be the determinative factor in
assessing tax fairness. 68 Instead, courts recognize the standard practice as
the determinant. 69 The nonprofit with several offices in different
jurisdictions will benefit or lose because of this variable assessment, and
the local government will suffer for its inability to assess adequately
properties in its jurisdiction.70
These findings are supported by a study on property tax exemptions
and local fiscal stress.7 1 Using a multi-jurisdictional approach in order to
reflect the numerous local tax levies that may affect a single parcel of
land, the study finds that broad categories for determining property tax
exemption translate into fiscal burdens for local jurisdictions. 72 This
study, however, also suggests that when localities have some control
over the effect of a property tax exemption, which is the case when the
state grants only a partial exemption, the local government can often
easily mitigate the negative fiscal effects.
The above considerations depend on the assumption that a local
government will be generally hostile toward the granting of an
exemption, especially by the state. But another, perhaps contrary
consideration suggests that nonprofits can be a significant benefit locally,
thereby offsetting the negative fiscal effects of an exemption. The
property tax exemption may encourage firms to locate in large cities and
may mean that the core central city would be largely occupied by
nonprofits. In a second-best world, there may be significant offsetting
effects of nonprofit activity within a city, such as an increase in the price
and the attractiveness of other property due to the amenities provided
by the nonprofit sector. The question is whether nonprofits generate
positive externalities that in fact outweigh the negative impact of
reduced property tax collection.

66. John K. Mullen, Property Tax Exemptions and Local Fiscal Stress, 43
NAT'L TAxJ. 467 (1990).
67. See e.g., John H. Bowman & John L. Mikesell, Assessment Uniformity:
The Standard and Its Attainment, 9 PROP. TAXJ. 219, 220 (1990).

68. Id.
69. Id. at 221.

70. Id.
71.

Mullen, supra note 66, at 467.

72. Id.
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B. Nonprofit Market Share
The recommendation that states institute a consistent system for
determining whether an organization is tax-exempt leads to a variety of
reproaches, all of which require further analysis. One current concern
with such a system centers around the notion that the property tax
exemption creates an unfair market share for nonprofits in any particular
area.7 3 This contention is not necessarily true. For instance, with respect
to the effects of property tax exemption on hospital location, higher
property taxes do not give rise to a greater nonprofit hospital share.
Higher property tax rates raise the chance that there will be only one
hospital in a county, but the tax rate does not determine whether the
74
hospital will be for-profit or nonprofit.
Additionally, commentators debate whether a property tax
exemption furnishes a rational means to support wealthy organizations.
Many of these commentators believe exemptions cause over-investment in
property. 7- Wealthy organizations receive substantial benefit while
poor, struggling entities, which in fact may be doing significantly more
76
good work, may not benefit at all because they rent their facilities.
C. Taxpayer Equity
Property tax exemptions also raise fundamental questions of taxpayer
equity, specifically whether it is fair to force the taxpayers who reside
near the exempt property to pay for the revenue loss when all of the
citizens of the region benefit from the nonprofit.77 Clearly, when a state
grants a property tax exemption to an organization that serves a
constituency larger than the locality in which it is located, fairness to
the municipality is undermined. In addition, consideration must be given
to which activities deserve exemption, thus raising the issue of
charitability. Does the nonprofit activity fill a gap in government
services and thus deserve in return a government subsidy in the form of a
tax exemption? The case for exemption weakens if the activity in
question can command sufficient fees to pay for local services, if the
73. Hansmann, supra note 19, at 71. Tax exemptions significantly increased
the market share of nonprofits in relation to their for-profit counterparts.
74. Cyril F. Chang & Howard P. Tuckman, Do Higher Property Tax Rates
Increase the Market Share of Non-profit Hospitals?, 43 NAT'L TAX J. 175, 179
(1990).
STEPHEN DAVID GOLD, PROPERTY TAX RELIEF 175, 242-43 (1979).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 190; John M. Quigley & Roger W. Schmenner, Property Tax
Exemption and Public Policy, 23 PUB. POL'Y 259, 259-97 (1975).

75.
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activity has no quasi-public features, or if the activity can be directed
solely toward middle-income or upper-income individuals because such
activities would bring a redistribution of wealth away from the poor.7 8
In other words, the case weakens for commercial nonprofits and for those
that do not act as charitable enterprises servicing the area in which they
are located.
The evidence is quite clear that nonprofits in the center cities serve
the suburbs to an inequitable degree. 9 In many situations, however,
locally financed subsidies may still be inappropriate, even if the
decision makers could agree that government subsidy to nonprofits in
general is good. For example, because students at a university frequently
come from outside the local government area, it would be more
appropriate for a state or federal government to finance any subsidy that
is warranted. Thus, a property tax exemption that is unaccompanied by a
subsidy from the state to the locality may not be appropriate.
Consequently, the tax-exempt institution finds itself responsible for
upgrading the neighborhood in which it is located. In this case, a
property tax exemption may be warranted in spite of the fact that the
enterprise serves a larger population than the locality. There is no
guarantee, however, that this property will generate a large enough
fiscal surplus to make up the costs of providing services to the tax-exempt
buildings. 80 If most of the expenditures of an organization, for instance a
nonprofit, are taken up in taxes or exported by buying outside the
community, then the impact on the local economy is lessened. With a
smaller tax burden, the expenditures of the nonprofit in the community
result in a greater income multiplier.8 1 While there will be a direct loss
of property tax revenue, the functioning of the nonprofit in the area
should balance out this revenue loss. These facts present a strong
argument for retention of exempt status for all charitable nonprofits, even
if, as in the case of universities or hospitals, the organization serves a
much larger area than the jurisdiction in which it is located.
Because of the underlying controversy regarding taxpayer equity,
nearly all discussions of the reform of the property tax, especially those
relating to the exemption of nonprofits, address inequities in the
incidence of the tax. Current discussions on this subject seem to disagree
with the argument that exemptions are totally positive for the locale
GOLD, supra note 75, at 3.
79. For instance, in Bridgeport, Connecticut in 1973, nearly half of the

78.

patients using the city's hospitals and two-thirds of the students of the city's
universities lived outside Bridgeport. Quigley & Schmenner, supra note 77, at
276-77.
80. GOLD, supra note 75, at 242.
81. H. CRAIG DAVIS, REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS AND PROJECT
EVALUATION 29-35 (1990).
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that grants them. Generally, the debate hinges on how to reform the
property tax system, not whether the system is in need of reform. Thus,
the focus of the remainder of this article must be on the ways in which
state government can reduce the stress levied on localities by providing
exemptions to certain organizations.
D. State and Local Policy Options
The amount of property allotted tax exempt status continues to grow
steadily. 2 Tax exemption is perceived as an appropriate government
subsidy to foster services and activities that are largely public or social
in nature8 3 Operations accorded tax-exempt status vary among states and
include religious, educational, and charitable activities. Public concern
over the existence of these tax exemptions can be traced to hostility
toward property tax in general. 84 Though few people advocate repealing
the existing property tax exemptions altogether, support can be found for
various fiscal alternatives. 85 These alternatives include retaining
exemptions as they currently stand; removing exemptions altogether;
instituting reimbursements to local governments to make up for lost
revenue due to an exemption granted at the state level; and charging user
fees to the exempt nonprofit.
1. Removing the exemption and substitution theory
Why, in fact, should government exempt nonprofit organizations?
Exemptions benefit the nonprofits by minimizing the government's
interference in the private sector and by promoting a pluralist approach
in satisfying society's needs. It has been noted that exempt institutions
"make a town a good place in which to live."8 6 The payment of property
taxes would cause some of the revenue of a nonprofit to go to the
government, thereby eluding the maximum charitable impact from the
nonprofit's revenue. While there is no question that the property tax
exemption is a government subsidy to the nonprofit, scholars debate about
the incidence of the tax and whether those who pay for the subsidy
should receive relief from a higher source. Should the locality pay for
82. L. Richard Gabler & John F. Shannon, The Exemption of Religious,
Educational, and Charitable Institutions from Property Taxation, in 4 TAXES,
RESEARCH PAPERS BY THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC

2535,2536-90 (1977).
83. Id. at 2542-44.

NEEDS

84. Id. at 2548-55.
85. Id. at 2546-55.
86. GOLD, supra note 75, at 242.
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the subsidy, or might the state? Or perhaps should the nonprofit itself
return some of the subsidy to the municipality?
One can argue that it would be salutary to remove property tax
exemptions altogether.87 The general substitution theory provides some
support to the proposition that nonprofits should be denied tax
exemptions. Substitution theory examines the extent to which the local
distribution of economic activity is tied to the problem of distribution of
production factors, such as land, labor, and capital. Substitution theory
states that movement of an enterprise from the central consumption point
to the periphery of the economic field implies the substitution of capital
and labor outlays for land use outlays. A move towards the central
8
Applied to the
consumption point will result in the reverse result.1
nonprofit sector, this theory indicates that if a nonprofit moves to the
periphery, the organization will have a smaller outlay in land, and
more outlay can be made for labor and capital. This shift would allow a
nonprofit to hire more people and provide better services, because its
income would no longer go toward property costs and taxes. According to
this scenario, as long as the nonprofit has no absolute need to locate in the
center of the city in order to fulfill its charitable purpose, the entity
should be encouraged to move to the periphery if only to rationalize its
own outlay structure. Following this line of argument, the nonprofit
should rightly receive no exemption.
A more complex version of the substitution principle takes into
consideration two types of substitutions: distance inputs and outlays.
With a greater amount of funds put into distance inputs, less money stays
available to pay for outlays. A nonprofit that provides help for the poor
will have greater distance inputs if it is in the suburbs then if it is in the
heart of the poor district of the city. A nonprofit at the central
consumption point, where the poor reside, is responsible only for minimal
distance inputs, and thus can put more revenue towards outlays. This
analysis argues for a more complex set of criteria for nonprofits that takes
into account the entity's role as a social provider.8 9
The removal of the exemptions from property would not eliminate all
inequities or spur development along the rational lines suggested by the
substitution theory. Government property would still enjoy exempt
status, which would render the removal of exemptions an inequitable
solution. For equity to be served, government action must be coordinated.
87. There is an economically commendable reason to deny exemptions
altogether. Eventually, however, the proposal fails for the simple reason that all
exemptions could never be removed because government-owned property will
always remain exempt. WALTER ISARD, LOCATION ANALYSIS AND GENERAL THEORY

31 (1990).
88. Id. at 31-33.
89. Id. at 38-40.
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The simple removal of exemptions would seem a crude act, serving only to
punish the nonprofit without necessarily solving the problems of local
finance that spurred arguments for removal of the exemption in the first
place. The removal of exemptions, a measure that would only affect
nongovernmental property, might add to the revenues of municipalities,
but such a measure would not be fair.10
A better approach consistent with substitution theory would be to tax
the land but exempt the building. This policy choice is discussed in the
following section.9 1
2. Reimburse local government for lost revenue
Although property tax exemptions provide implicit subsidies to
nonprofits, some commentators suggest that states explicitly subsidize
local governments to compensate for lost revenue. 92 Local and state
governments have within their control several ways of rationalizing the
processes of granting exemptions. These methods could effectively
equalize the impact of the tax exemption across the constituencies of the
nonprofits that may benefit, and could make the property taxation of
charitable nonprofits more administratively effective in general. 93 Some
local governments already receive reimbursement from the state or
federal government for exempt property; the payments involved usually
are relatively small. 94 Because the state government mandates the
exemptions, reimbursement for exempt government property makes good
political sense. A parallel system of reimbursement by the state for
charitable nonprofits makes similar sense, if we accept the thesis that
these nonprofits provide services normally associated with local and
state governments. Because the state ordinarily grants the exemption,
subsidies to municipalities provide a logical alternative in the case of
the nonprofit that serves a larger area than the city in which it is
located. 95 Thus the state would pay, in cash, the price for authorizing
the exemption, and the citizens of the city in question would not be
punished for providing a needed service to outsiders.
While the thought that states can and should reimburse local
governments for their losses through property tax exemptions may
appear to be an appealing option, in fact the execution of such a logical
90. Quigley &Schmenner, supra note 77, at 280.
91.

See infra notes 125-32 and accompanying text.

92. Id.
93. Gabler & Shannon, supra note 82, at 2557-58.
94.

GOLD, supra note 75, at 243; Quigley & Schmenner, supra note 77, at 280-

82; Gabler &Shannon, supra note 82, at 2555-61.
95.

Connecticut Legislators Consider Nonprofit Tax Measures, STATE TAX

TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter/Spring 1993, at 3.
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plan would require much administrative expansion and would open the
door to new questions of equity. In order for a local government to receive
a reimbursement, two conditions should be met. First, the state would be
required to grant exempt status to the organization. Second, the
organization must serve a wider public than that encompassed by the
locality. Here, states confront a broad set of difficulties, which include
the need for a proper and regular assessment of the exempt property, the
need to determine the proportion of the exemption that state residents
outside of the locality must bear, the argument that states should not
spend their money in this way, and the question of whether wealthier
local areas should benefit from the subsidies to the same extent as poorer
ones.
First, exempt property is rarely assessed as thoroughly and regularly
as taxable property.9 6 There is little justification for assessing that
which is not taxed, at least not in overburdened localities. But, in order
to adequately determine the level of a state subsidy to a local
government, a regular and adequate assessment must be made of the
exempt property. The owner of the property itself would prefer that the
assessment not be made regularly, because, unlike the controversy a direct
government subsidy to a charitable organization endures, with that of
the concomitant political pressures and conflicts, the exemption is a
subsidy that is not subject to regular public debate. To insist on a regular
and comprehensive assessment of exempt properties would be necessary,
but expensive, given the fact that such assessments have been ignored in
the past.
Second, the idea of asking the state to equalize the local loss of funds
is a difficult one to devise. Although attractive in theory, the idea may
not provide a manageable method of determining how much of the local
burden the state should take over. Certainly, the local government
should remain responsible for that proportion of the exemption that
benefits local citizens. Logically, the state then would assume the burden
for those individuals who utilize the service of the charitable nonprofit
(e.g., schools, hospitals), yet live outside the locality in which the
organization is located. But this endeavor would require extensive
research to determine the proper proportion. In fact, this research cannot
be accomplished without the type of regular assessments described
above.
Third, should the state institute a policy of subsidizing overburdened
local governments, dissenters likely will question whether this method
provides the best or even a reasonable way to spend state money. One can
argue that this whole concept merely amounts to a transfer within the
state, and therefore it is not a simple outlay.
96. Gabler &Shannon, supra note 82, at 2538.
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Finally, wealthier cities should not expect a large boost from the
state with regard to subsidies. While larger cities may not need the
subsidy, poorer metropolitan areas would certainly benefit. Thus, the
government subsidy could be used to equalize the differences in wealth
across a given state. This injects a subjective element into the argument.
If the state undertakes the work necessary to subsidize local governments,
poor areas would respond positively, and wealthy ones, which
stand to
97
receive less, still would welcome the infusion of state funds.
3. User or service fees
Another option under consideration by governments focuses on the
imposition of payments-in-lieu-of-taxes, user fees, or service fees on
nonprofits. This option is particularly popular when an exempt
organization has substantial property holdings. Imposing user fees would
be more discrete than removing exemptions, an alternative which might
threaten the existence of many nonprofits. 98 For its statistical
compilations, the Bureau of the Census defines user charges as "amounts
received from the public for performance of specific services benefitting
the person charged and from sales of commodities and services."9' Under
this concept, municipal utilities (water, electricity gas, etc.), which also
fit the general concept of user charges, report their statistics
separately. 100
With the current fiscal problems governments now face,
municipalities often find it easier to increase other sources of revenue
than to increase taxes.' 0' But, the Union Institute argues that user fees
are equally problematic. The Nonprofit Policy Agenda strongly
disagrees with the idea of implementing user fees when they are
employed solely to compensate for revenue lost through the property tax
exemptions. 0 2 Specifically, the Institute propounds as its second
taxation recommendation, namely that "[glovernment should not employ
user fees as revenue raisers. But when government services can be
measured and directly benefit a nonprofit organization, that
organization ought to be treated like any citizen who uses the service.'' 13

97. Id. at 2557-58.
98. Id. at 2558-60.
99. B UREAU OF THE CENSUS, GOVERNMENTAL FINANCES (1978-79).
100. JOHN L. MIKESELL, FISCAL ADMINISTRATION: ANALYSIS AND APPLICATIONS
TO THE PUBLIC SECTOR

269-70 (1982).

101. H. William Batt, User Fees: The Nontax Revenue Alternative, 93
TAX NOTES 64-12 (1993) at 1.
102. KOCH, supra note 2, at 93.

103. Id. (Recommendation 47).

STATE

19931

TAXES ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

The option of assessing payments-in-lieu-of-taxes has gained
popularity, but for reasons contrary to those that the Union Institute
considers valid. These payments have been imposed merely for their
potential as revenue-raisers.10 4 Despite the randomness of the assessment
of payments-in-lieu-of-taxes, this approach continues to gather
momentum in various states and localities. The popularity of this option,
however, does not emerge from the wisdom of its application. The
approach simply provides the quickest and easiest solution for

municipalities under budgetary pressure."3 5
The Union Institute draws a distinction between user fees, which "are
assessed for actual charges incurred for things such as water, sewer usage
and waste disposal" and service fees which are "generally charged for
municipal services the use of which is less measurable, such as police and
fire protection or road maintenance."' 06 Thus user fees place charges on
goods with an accentuated private characteristic, while service fees are
1°7
charged for public goods provided by municipalities or states.
The most important difference between user fees and taxes lies in the
degree of choice for the individual payor. Some user fees are voluntary;
an individual or firm can choose not to receive the service, and thus not to
pay. On the other hand, taxes by nature are compulsory and are not
linked to any government services, individually or separately. User fees
seem legitimate and superficially, they are quite simple because the

104. Batt, supra note 101, at 2 (noting that nontax revenues have risen to well
over 20 percent of total revenues).
105. For a discussion of this development, see Exemption Challenges
Continue, STATETAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Spring 1990, at 6; Hospital Battles
Continue in Pennsylvania, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Spring 1991, at 9.
In another major decision regarding payments-in-lieu-of-taxes, Yale University

agreed in 1990 to pay $2.6 million to New Haven, Connecticut, as well as to place
some of its property on the tax rolls and to pay $2.16 million in additional fees for
fire protection and sidewalk refurbishment. This package came as a result of
community dissatisfaction with Yale's exempt status. See Yale Agrees to Pay
New Haven For City Services, STATETAXTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Summer 1990,
at 2.

In 1992, the Board of Representatives of Stamford, Connecticut considered a
resolution that would require the city to ask nonprofits to contribute five percent
of their would-be property tax bill as a payment in lieu of taxes. Stamford
estimated that each nonprofit would be asked for from $300 to $10,000. S e e
Stamford May Seek Payments in Lieu of Taxes, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR
NONPROFITS, Winter 1992, at 3.
106. KOCH, supra note 2, at'92.
107. MIKESELL, supra note 100, at 269-71; see also Carl S. Shoup, Rules for
Distributing a Free Government Service Among Areas of a City, 42 NAT'L TAXJ.
103 (1989) (discussing findings for distributing inputs and suggestions).
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individual pays in proportion to the benefit received. 10 8 This
characteristic makes user fees easier to accept than many taxes.
However, sometimes individuals or firms do not receive a right to refuse
a service, such as garbage collection and police protection. 1°9 This may be
based on considerations of the negative impact that refusal could have
upon the neighborhood. If the charges are not compulsory, the main
advantage of user fees over outright taxation is that the fees provide a
concrete method to gauge consumers' desires for particular services, while
also creating funds to provide those services." 0
When land receives an exemption from property tax, the city loses
that revenue but the cost to maintain the property, including the use of
city services, stays virtually at the same level."' User fees are used by
local municipalities in order to offset the cost of the services that have
been supplied to property. The payer of the fee receives a tangible and
measurable benefit which is associated with the activity. Typically the
fee level is structured so that the total monies collected from all payers
equals the cost of providing the service to the public. Fees are usually
considered as cost liquidators and not as profit-makers for the
jurisdictions charging them." 2 Employment of user fees at all levels of
exempt property may also remove an incentive for tax exempt
organizations to hold idle or vacant land that is no longer needed, and
may curb the tendency of nonprofits to invest in real estate." 3 In this
way, user fees might prompt the same change in behavior that a land tax
would create. Economists favor user fees for the same reason they favor
the use of prices in the free market: the minimization of waste by
consumers and the efficient allocation of resources." 4 By adjusting the
108. Batt, supra note 101, at 4.
109. MIKESELL, supra note 100, at 271-72.
110. Id. at 273. When user charges are compulsory, the Union Institute's
argument against revenue-raising takes on new importance. For example,
legislation that would require charities to pay "user fees" for IRS letters that
confirm their status as charitable or that would clarify sections of the law used to
determine that status clearly seems to be a means of raising government
revenue, since that is information without which the organization could not
function as a charity. The Union Institute adamantly refuses to endorse this sort
of user charge. Charities Now Must Pay "User Fees" to IRS, 21 PHILANTHROPY
MONTHLY 18-20 (1988).
111.

GREATER HARTFORD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, PROPERTY TAX EXEMPTIONS

AND NON-PROFIT INSTITUTIONS:

A STUDY AND ACTION PROGRAM 3 (1978)

[hereinafter GREATER HARTFORD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE .

112. John C. Healy, Can User Fees Provide Property Tax Relief?, 4 J. PROP.
48 (1992).

TAX MGMT.

113.
114.

GREATER HARTFORD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 111, at 7.
Id. at 10.
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fee, the demand for a product or service can be regulated so that optimum
levels of consumption can be attained at any time, thus fostering the
efficiency of the service not achieved by general taxes.' Is
User fees become more feasible when a good that is essentially public
in nature closely resembles a private good. User fees can be properly
implemented when the activities financed meet two conditions: they
benefit separately and are chargeable. User fees are most feasible when
individuals, rather than the community, benefit from the service. There
is a prerequisite, economical method for excluding from a service benefit
those who do not pay for the service. Measurability is characteristic to
these services, directly or through approximations.'1 6 In other words, if
the service in question can be declined by the consumer (for instance,
electricity or water), then a charge can easily and fairly be determined.
Service fees which are related to the provision of public goods will
not possess these characteristics. For instance, everyone pays for police
protection and everyone needs it. In the absence of a right to deny service,
and given the inability of the government to place a value on it, this sort
of service fee should not be assessed upon the nonprofits.' 7 As a fellow
provider of public goods, nonprofits should not be taxed for these services
or pay charges for them.
It is difficult to measure the consumption of certain public services,
such as fire or police protection, traffic control, or road maintenance. In
115. Batt, supra note 101, at 5.
116. M IKESELL, supra note 100, at 272-73. Batt agrees that,
Goods and services that are substantially public in their nature are best

financed by general, broad-based taxes-taxes that should be
evaluated according to ability to pay. User fees, however, are best used
to support the provision of goods and services that are in good part
private in their character but that, for whatever reason, are provided by
government rather than the private-sector economy.
Batt, supra note 101, at 4.

117. The states have experimented with various arrangements.

In

Massachusetts in early 1993, for example, Boston representatives introduced a

bill authorizing municipal governments to assess a fee on tax-exempt property to
support "local public safety." The fee would apply to the property of charitable
organizations, as well as literary, benevolent, and scientific institutions. See
Municipal Services Fee Proposal Introduced, STATE TAXTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS,
Winter/Spring 1993, at 5. Oregon's legislature attempted to amend the state's
constitution so as to allow municipal governments to charge a fee on emergency
services, including fire-fighting, law enforcement, and emergency medical
services. The fee could not exceed 10 percent of the local tax rate. For a
discussion of the proposal, see Legislature Considering Emergency Services Fee,
STATE TAXTRENDs FOR NONPROFITS, Winter/Spring 1993, at 8-9.
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fact, no administratively feasible method exists for measuring the
consumption of most publicly-provided services. It has been questioned
whether payments for non-utility-type services would be significant
because the marginal cost of services is frequently lower than the
average. 118 One economist suggested that one method of determining the
lost service costs is to levy on nonprofits that percentage of the mill rate
which is attributable to property-related services. For example, if
property-related services constitute one-third of all local government
expenditures, then a tax exempt institution would pay a user fee equal to
one-third the normal mill rate multiplied by its assessed value.
However, the resulting fee is similar to a property tax, and the
maintenance of the property tax exemption is the reason for even
considering user fees." 9
The Wisconsin legislature passed, but the governor vetoed, a user fee
on exempt properties because of the apparent inequality in its
application to taxable property. 20 This precedent provides an
illustration of an attempt to collect user fees on both tangible (private)
and intangible (public) goods. The Wisconsin attorney general noted
three provisions which raised constitutional questions: (1) the user fee
applied only to exempt property; (2) municipalities could choose to
impose it on only some categories of exempt property; and (3) the fee, if
implemented, would reflect costs of services, such as fire and police
protection, which do not benefit the exempt property directly or
exclusively. 12' In essence, the restrictive nature of the fee was perceived

118. GOLD, supra note 75, at 243.
119. GREATER HARTFORD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 111, at 10.
120. KOCH, supra note 2, at 93.
121. Healy, supra note 112, at 50. Also, Hartford, Connecticut's delegation to
the Connecticut state legislature has introduced a number of bills addressing the
high number of exempt organizations in the community. One bill would permit
municipalities to negotiate with exempt organizations for payments for services;
another would increase state aid to localities to compensate for revenues lost to
property tax exemptions; yet another would include special service districts in
the payment in lieu of taxes program. See Connecticut Legislators Consider
Nonprofit Tax Measures, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter/Spring
1993, at 3. Additionally, Providence, Rhode Island may ask the state assembly for
the authority to assess a municipal services fee on university dormitories. See
Providence Considers Municipal Services Fee, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter 1992, at 7. The Pennsylvania League of Cities has demanded
that the state legislature allow municipal governments to collect service charges

on all exempt property. This is in view of the proliferation of exempt property,
the fact that exempt status is rarely reviewed, the fact that exempts benefit from
services, and the fact that nonresidents benefit from the tax-exempt enterprises.
The League also calls on the state to re-certify exempt enterprises every five

(continued)
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as a violation of the Wisconsin uniformity clause because the tax was
exacted on a specific type of property. In a general sense, a user fee
applied to an exempt organization should charge for only services that
directly affect the organization. Charging nonprofits for abstract
services, such as police and fire protection which benefit all property
owners, would violate the need in the municipality for horizontal equity.
Given that the positive externalities of property tax exemption do
not always make up for actual loss of revenue to government, user fees for
services become an important factor when determining what the
nonprofit sector ought to pay as compensation.' 12 The actual services
consumed, such as electricity, water, and sewage processing, ought to be
compensated. This is especially true when the nonprofit organization
charges a fee to its users for that organization's resources, as in the cases
of university tuition or hospital charges. 23 At a minimum, the state and
local government ought to identify the contribution the nonprofit
organization makes to the community and determine which services are
consumed. This proposition finds additional support in light of the
growing nonprofit economy. 124 But, as with other possible revisions in the
taxation of nonprofits, the question of assessment is overwhelming. How
can a city be expected to evaluate adequately the services consumed by an
organization when the same city probably cannot even afford to assess
exempted property?
Although it is not always clearly specified, the property tax
actually has two components: land tax and structure tax. One writer has
25
recently referred to the land tax as a potential "super user charge."
There is a fixed amount of land available, but improvements on that land
are not fixed. A tax on land values does not affect the market outcome.
However, a tax on structure will alter the outcome of the markets and
will lead to fewer improvements than there would be with a tax
years. See League of Cities Supports Mandatory Municipal Service Charges,
STATE TAXTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Spring 1992, at 7.
122. Richard M. Bird & Enid Slack, Urban Finance and User Charges, in
STATE AND LOCAL FINANCE: THE PRESSURES OF THE 19805 211 (George Break ed.,

1983) (considering financing urban public and social services through user
charges and concluding that there is ample evidence to charge for services
under some circumstances); Paul B. Downing, User and Service Fees, in CRISIS
AND CONSTRAINT IN MUNICIPAL FINANCE 160, 160-99 (James Carr ed., 1984)

(comparing the effects and efficiencies of a property tax versus a user charge).
123. With respect to tuition and the actual subsidy for education especially
by nonprofits, see David S. Davenport, Education and Human Capital: Pursuing
an Ideal Income Tax and a Sensible Tax Policy, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 793 (1992);
Joseph Dodge, Scholarships Under the Income Tax, 46 TAXLAw. 697 (1993).
124. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 69-70.
125. Rybeck, supra note 57, at 133-47.
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exemption. 126 Thus, advocates of the abandonment of the structure tax
argue that only those who improve their properties are punished. Like
user fees, the exclusive use of a land tax would render property taxes more
subject to the effects of the market. High property taxes result in a slow
but steady disinvestment in the housing market, because the landowner
spends more money on taxes than on improvements.127 In order to make up
property tax revenue, either the tax rates on adjoining properties must
rise, services must be reduced, or some combination thereof must occur. 128
The idea of imposing a relatively high land tax and a much lower
structure tax, or no structure tax at all, is open to reproach. Some would
argue that such a tax system punishes those taxpayers who are least able
to pay more than those who can easily pay. However, proponents would
use this argument in reverse, rebutting with the assertion that the urban
poor rarely own property. If these individuals do own property, they
own more building value than land value, since by virtue of their
destitution, they cannot afford to live where land prices are high.
Ultimately, these proponents argue, the land tax will make the inner
city a better place to live by virtue of the fact that the land tax will
prompt landowners to improve their lots or sell them. 29
The argument for eliminating the structure tax in favor of a simple
land tax boasts of a long pedigree and seems to have the character of a
crusade.130 Yet, this should not subtract from the self-evident appeal of
the proposal. The proponents of a land tax argue that the owner who
develops his property must not be punished with a building tax; the
property owner who allows the land to go unused will justly be penalized
for allowing nature's gift to sit idle. 31 These proponents believe in the
method mainly because it promotes development in cities. They
126. THE URBAN INSTITUTE, PROPERTY TAX REFORM 9 (George E. Peterson ed.,
1973) [hereinafter THE URBAN INSTITUTE]; see also TAXATION, RESOURCE AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, LAND AND BUILDING TAXES: THEIR EFFECT
ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Arthur P. Becker ed., 1969); Heilbrun, supra note

56.
127.

THE URBAN INSTITUTE, supra note 126, at 10.

128. GREATER HARTFORD CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, supra note 111, at 2.
129. Rybeck, supra note 57, at 145.
130. See, e.g., Mason Gaffney, An Agenda for Strengthening the Property
Tax, in PROPERTY TAX REFORM, supra note 126, at 65-84 (arguing that property tax
relief is not needed but rather assessment reform is needed as well as a shift of
the property tax to the state level in part and a conversion of the property tax into
a tax on site value).
131. Arthur P. Becker, Principles of Taxing Land and Buildings for Economic
Development, in LAND AND BUILDING TAXES, supra note 126, at 24-30; Steven B.
Cord, Taxing Land More Than Buildings: The Record in Pennsylvania in THE
PROPERTY TAX AND LOCAL FINANCE, supra note 56, at 172.

19931

TAXES ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

approach the land tax as a component of a solution to inner city
degradation and underdevelopment. After decades of arguing for a land
tax, Pennsylvania has tested the idea. As such, the results of the
Pennsylvania experiment have been positive. 132 These results have
apparently not prompted more municipalities to move to a higher land
tax, although, it is difficult to ascertain whether these municipalities
are currently considering the idea.
It is important to note that insofar as nonprofits are concerned, these
results testify only to the desirability of taxing land and not to the
structure of the property tax exemption should it be modified. In order to
reduce the negative impact of empty lots on neighboring properties and to
spur nonprofits to release the property, the government must raise taxes.
Then the land tax, not the structure tax, should be increased.
Both the assessment of user fees on nonprofits and the idea of state
government subsidies to the municipality involve payments from the
nonprofit or the state. In the first instance, the nonprofit itself would
reimburse the locality for those services that could be enumerated and
evaluated. In the second instance, the state government would attempt to
alleviate the stress on local governments by subsidizing the existence of
those nonprofits that have been granted exemptions by the state without
regard for the revenues of the locality. Both options suffer from the same
difficulties, although each clearly affects the nonprofit in different
ways. Because the word "tax" has a narrow meaning, other revenuegenerating devices will become even more important as a method of
governmental control over economic behavior, a necessity to meet public
133
policy demands.
Both government subsidies and user fees flounder on the issue of
accurate assessment. Can state and local governments adequately
evaluate the cost of an exemption to a nonprofit? And if so, can those
governments then be expected accurately to factor into the evaluation the
value of the nonprofit itself to society? In other words, the exemption
itself has an intrinsic worth that can be translated into actual dollars.
But then the value of the services that the nonprofit provides must be
considered before a reliable figure for a subsidy can be reached.
Similarly, municipalities and nonprofits could hardly be expected to
agree on a valuation of services provided to the nonprofit by the city.
Nonetheless, since this question is but a part of a much larger discussion
132. Cord, supra note 131, at 172-74. Pittsburgh, Scranton, Harrisburg, New
Cartle, and McKeesport Pennsylvania all altered their property tax structure in
the late 1970's. Pittsburgh's property tax had been 4.95% on land and 2.48% on
structures in 1978; in 1982, the rates were 13.3% on land and 3.2% on structures.
As a result, building permits issues in Pittsburgh rose from 3179 to 4335; the value
of the improvements multiplied tenfold.
133. Batt, supra note 101, at 794.
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of user fees levied on all exempt property, not merely nonprofits, the
Union Institute's contention that nonprofits should only be charged for
those services that fall under the rubric of "private goods" is a
reasonable one. The use of state government subsidies to local
governments makes a great deal of sense, if they can be accurately
valued. 13 4 The use of an exclusive land tax as opposed to the current
method of a combined land and structure tax, applies to a much broader
sample of properties than just nonprofits. The land tax might rationalize
the use of land by all organizations, including nonprofits.
Less apocalyptic possibilities for reform of the exemption system
exist for nonprofits. These alternatives include systematic assessment,
with yearly revisions to assure that a nonprofit granted an exemption
1
decades before does not remain exempted if it has transformed itself; 3
regular publication of assessments of nonprofits, to make public discussion
more open and fruitful, might lead to the rationalization of the pattern
of exemption; 36 and finally, the simple tightening of the definition of
charitability would likely uncover organizations that do not replace
government services in any systematic way. The last option has been
utilized with positive effect in Pennsylvania. In the 1985 decision
Hospital Utilization Project v. Commonwealth 37, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court noted five factors that would determine whether a
hospital could properly acquire and maintain charity status. To be
considered charitable, a hospital must advance a charitable purpose;
must donate a substantial portion of its services; must benefit a
substantial and indefinite class of persons who are subjects of charity;
must relieve the government of some of its burden; and must not operate
with a profit motive.1 38
134.

OuVEROLDMAN

& FERDINAND P. SCHOETTLE,

STATE AND LOCAL TAXES AND

344 (1974). These authors suggest the following notions: "It has been
suggested that where the state decides and mandates that particular categories
of property are to be exempt from local property taxation the burden of that
exemption should be bome by the state as a whole and not the locality in which
the property happens to be." Id.
135. The Pennsylvania League of Cities has called on the state of
Pennsylvania to re-certify exempt enterprises every five years. League of Cities
Supports Mandatory Municipal Service, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS,
FINANCE

Spring 1992, at 7.
136. Gabler & Shannon, supra note 82, at 2562.
137. 487 A.2d 1306 (Pa. 1985).
138. Id. at 1317. These rules confused many hospitals and even the courts,
which applied the second condition unevenly at best. Thus, in 1991, a bill was
introduced in the state legislature to clarify the five-point test. It remains a
contentious subject, however.
See INDEPENDENT REGULATORY REVIEW
COMMISSION, COMMENTS ON DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE REGULATION

No. 15-251

(continued)
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(1991); Proposed Sales Tax Exemption Under Attack, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR
NONPROFITS, Fall 1991, at 8. In one case in 1990, a state court found a hospital in
Allentown to be charitable according to the above five-point definition. St. Luke's
Hosp. v. Board of Assessment Appeals, No. 88-C-2691, slip op. at 29-30 (Pa. C.P.
Apr. 19, 1990). In a second case in 1992, the exemption was removed because the
hospital failed four out of five of the tests. School Dist. of Erie v. Hamot Medical
Ctr., 602 A.2d 407, 414-15 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992); see also Hospitals Win One,
Lose One, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Summer 1990, at 3. In the second
case, the Hamot Medical Center declined to pay a $100,000 payment in lieu of
taxes, and the municipal government sued. In the end, the center had to pay
almost $5 million in taxes through 1992. School Dist. of Erie v. Hamot Medical
Center, No. 1319, slip op. at 29-30 (Pa. C.P. Jan. 9,1992); see Pennsylvania Hospital
Loses Tax Exemption, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter 1992, at 6.
Finally, a judge in Lehigh Valley, Pennsylvania ordered a nonprofit hospital to
restructure if it wished to retain its tax-exempt status. See Judge Tells Hospital to
Restructure, STATE TAXTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Fall 1990, at 7. The Erie County
Board of Assessment Appeals has continued its vigorous challenges in 1993. The
board reevaluated 600 exempt parcels and determined that a stunning 597 did
not qualify for exemption. Those property owners may agree to pay 50% of their
tax bill in payments-in-lieu-of-taxes from 1993 to 1996. After 1996, they will be
placed in categories of charitability which will define them as paying 25%, 50%, or
all of their property tax bill. This aggressive action in Erie is based on the dire
financial situation of the municipality and the interpretation of the five-point
definition noted above that was established in 1985. One specific problem in the
application of that standard is the second condition requiring that charities must
"donate or render gratuitously" their services. In Erie, the board concluded that
this stipulation means a charity must give its services at 50% or less of market
value (which remains undefined).
See Erie PA Charities Face Widespread
Payments in Lieu of Taxes, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter/Spring
1993, at 1.
New Hampshire has redefined "charitable" regarding the property tax
exemption: organizations are charitable if they perform services for the public
good or welfare for the benefit of the general public or an indefinite segment of
it, if they offer no pecuniary profit to officers or members, and if they do not
restrict benefits to officers or members. This definition will add benevolent and
fraternal organizations to .the tax rolls. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 72:23-1 (1993); see
Legislature Defines Charitable,STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Fall 1991, at
7-8.
In addition, the state senate in Colorado passed legislation narrowly defining
exempt purposes: charitable, educational, and religious organizations must now
prove that they spend over 50% of their revenues on exempt purposes. Co. S.B.
88, 59th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1993); see Colorado Nonprofits Face Uncertain
Future; Possible Restrictions on Property Tax Exemptions, STATE TAXTRENDS FOR
NONPROFITS, Winter/Spring 1993, at 2.
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IV. SALES TAX EXEMPTION

In its third taxation recommendation, the Union Institute states that,
"Sales tax exemption for either sales or purchases should be extended to
all organizations exempt under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
with the exception of those sales and purchases
not substantially related
39
to the organization's exempt purpose.'
Because this recommendation is all-encompassing, it opens itself to
many reproaches. For instance, some section 501(c)(3) organizations do
not remotely resemble a charitable institution. 140 Thus the
139. KOCH, supra note 2, at 94 (Recommendation 48).
140. The variations among states regarding sales tax exemptions, which
include taxes on sales and purchases, are too complicated to characterize. One
must remember that nonprofit organizations include, at the most general level,
all § 501(c)(3) organizations. Within that heading is the entire spectrum of
nonprofits: religious, educational, charitable, fraternal, scientific, etc. No two
states exempt the same organizations in the same way. For instance, six states
exempt sales by § 501(c)(3) organizations, with qualifications; eight exempt sales
by charitable organizations; eighteen exempt sales by some charitable
organizations; thirty-four states exempt sales by educational organizations;
fourteen of these (including eleven of those mentioned above) exempt some
sales by educational organizations other than schools. All of the above
categories include overlaps, and all of them have specific clauses excluding and
including organizations that appear to fall under the given heading. See Sales
Tax Exemptions for Charitable, Educational, and Religious Organizations, 11
STATE TAXTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS Summer 1992 at 1-4. Indiana provides an
example of a state which allows sales tax exemptions, allowing exemptions for
both sales and purchases if certain conditions are met. Section 6-2.5-5-25(a) of
the Indiana Code, dealing with purchases, states:
Transactions involving tangible personal property or service are exempt
from the state gross retail tax, if the person acquiring the property or
service: (1)is an organization which is granted a gross income tax
exemption under IC 6-2.1-3-20, IC 6-2.1-3-21, or 6-2.1-3-22; (2) primarily
uses the property or service to carry on or to raise money to carry on the
not-for-profit purpose for which it receives the gross income tax
exemption; and (3) is not an organization operated predominately for
social purposes.
CODE § 6-2.5-5-25(a) (1989).
Thus, the Code excludes from the liberal "any lawful purpose" clause the
purpose of social organizations for sales tax exemption. As for sales, §§ 6-2.5-526(a) and (b) state:
(continued)
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recommendation would offer new complications for governments as well
as the nonprofits that must follow the often tedious regulations that
these complications imply. In addition, one must consider the attitude of
those for-profit organizations with which the nonprofits often compete.
While most nonprofit organizations would prefer to produce
charitable goods, when their budgets are cut, they often must resort to
selling private output to support their charitable activities. As a result,
there is good reason for private businesses to be concerned because
decreased government funding for nonprofits tends to force the nonprofits
into the private markets to compete with private businesses. 141 The rise
in commercial sales by nonprofits has introduced the important
distinction between taxation on sales related and unrelated to the
charitable purpose of the nonprofit.
In order to reduce the regressivity of the sales tax, governments make
use of exemptions or selective taxation on certain goods. For instance,
many states try to solve the welfare problems of low income classes by

Sales of tangible personal property are exempt from the state gross
retail tax, if: (1) the seller is an organization which is granted a gross
income tax exemption under IC6-2.1-3-19, IC 6-2.1-3-20, IC6-2.1-3-21, or
IC 6-2.1-3-22 (2)the organization makes the sale to make money to carry
on the not-for-profit purpose for which it receives its gross income tax
exemption; and (3) the organization does not make those sales during
more than thirty (30) days in a calendar year; ... (b)(2) the seller is not
operated predominantly for social purposes; (3) the property sold is
designed and intended primarily either for the organization's
educational, cultural, or religious purposes, or for improvement of the
work skills or professional qualifications of the organization's members;
and (4) the property sold is not designed or intended primarily for use in
carrying on a private or proprietary business. (c) The exemption
provided by this section does not apply to an accredited college or
university's sales of books, stationary, haberdashery, supplies, or other
property.

§ 6-2.5-5-26 (1989).
Here, the legislature has again excluded social purpose organizations from
sales tax exemption. Also, sales tax exemption may be granted only if gross
income tax is exempted. In addition, in (b)(2), purposes are limited to
educational, cultural, or religious from the broad "any lawful purpose" found in
the Indiana incorporation statute.
141. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 110-11. For example, a 10% decrease in
government support would lead to an increase of nonprofit sales by 1.3%.
IND. CODE
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exemptions on some basic products, such as food and drugs."42 Findings
that are justified according to the basic principle of charitability suggest
a similar rationale for consideration regarding nonprofits. The
charitable nonprofits' activities are aimed in a considerable measure to
satisfy the demands of lower income classes, either directly or through
the provision of public goods. Thus, exemption is justified except for
purchases and sales not related to the charitable purpose of the
nonprofit.14 3 However, finding an explicit link between the legal criteria
for tax-blessed charitable activity and assistance to the poor is a
difficult task. The one author who has tried to trace the degree to which
charity results in a downward shift of income and wealth concluded that
the redistributional effects of philanthropy are incalculable, in the most
literal sense of the word.'"
Given the facts that the nonprofits' share in the economy in the last
thirty years has doubled and that the nonprofits continue to shift toward
commercial operations, many different approaches to taxation of sales
and purchases of goods and services by nonprofits have developed.' 45
Some adaptations to the new economic realities of sales tax politics visiA-vis commercial nonprofits would preserve both the revenue base and an
optimal balance between sectors. The revisions proposed by one
authority draw a distinction between the economic consequences and the

142. LENNOX MOAK & FRANK COWAN, MANUAL OF SUGGESTED PRACTICE FOR
ADMINISTRATION OF LOCAL SALES AND USE TAXES 59, 61 (1961); JOHN DUE, SALES
TAXATION 22-29 (1957).

143. Several decisions limited the exemptions that one normally associates
with nonprofit status. In Virginia, a nonprofit clearinghouse for services to the
needy had to pay sales and use taxes except for those used in its homeless
shelter (a division within its operation). There is no general sales tax exemption
in Virginia, but homeless shelters have an exemption that will expire in July 1993.
Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 89-312, [2 Va.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 201-820 (Nov. 7,
1989). In addition, a Virginia taxpayer that is a "ministry" but not a church is not
exempt from sales taxes on purchases in spite of its connection with several area
churches and its mission, which is AIDS education and church services for
victims and their families. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 89-313, [2 Va.] St. Tax.
Rep. (CCH) 201-822 (Nov. 7, 1989). Finally, again in Virginia, where no general
exemption exists, a nonprofit that operates a "clearing house" and "resource
center" for missing and exploited children does not qualify for an exemption on
its purchases. Ruling of Commissioner, P.D. 89-213, [2 Va.] St. Tax. Rep. CCH 1
201-800 (Aug. 4,1989).
144. Simon, supra note 6, at 83-84.
145. John L. Mikesell & Billy Hamilton, Sales Tax Policy During the Next
Decade, in

SALES TAXATION, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICY A DMINISTRATION

(William F. Fox ed., 1992).
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logic for exemption of purchases and sales of nonprofits. 146 There are
three specific types of sales taxes under consideration here-sales tax on
purchases, sales, and services.
A. Tax on Purchases
Theoretically, the sales tax is a tax on consumption, but many states
impose a tax on production purchases, ignoring in the interest of increased
revenue the original intent of the tax. Given the illogic of the tax on
production purchases, a state that taxes these purchases should do so
consistently for nonprofit and for-profit organizations. Otherwise, the
exemption for the sales tax on production purchases will represent an
unwarranted subsidy to the nonprofit and would constitute an
interventionist state tax policy. Such a policy would violate horizontal
equity, unless the relative loss of revenue of for-profits and/or
government is compensated accordingly by the benefits provided by the
nonprofits. Exemption for nonprofit purchases should be regarded as a
subsidy of the collectivity through its other taxpayers. Generally,
exemptions from sales taxes on purchases should be difficult to receive
147
and generally, "a presumption against exemption is appropriate.'
B. Tax on Sales of Goods
The tax exemption of sales by nonprofits is a very delicate matter,
principally because its logic cannot be related to charitability in the
same way or on the same level as the tax on purchases. It is also a
growing issue, given the expansion of the commercial nonprofits. There
are two possible solutions: apply the exemption more extensively, or

146. John L. Mikesell, Sales Taxation of Nonprofit Organizations: Purchases
and Sales, in SALES TAXATION, CRITICAL ISSuES IN PoLIcY ADMINISTRATION supra

note 145, at 129 (considering philanthropic nonprofits in light of classic nonprofit

theory).
147. Id. at 129. Parenthetically, it should be noted that Mikesell proposes
that a pass-through exemption be granted to contractors in cases when purchase
exemptions are given. This logical suggestion appears to have been adopted in
at least two states that did not have a pass-through exemption when Mikesell
wrote. Florida and Virginia have both ruled that in cases when the contractor
acts as a purchasing agent for an exempt organization, materials purchased for
use by the organization are exempt from sales tax on the purchase. Technical
Assistance Advisement, No. 89A-053, [2 Fla.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 202-144
(Revenue Dep't Oct. 18, 1989); Virginia Tax Bulletin 92-2, [2 Va.] St. Tax. Rep.
(CCH) 9 202-116 (Apr. 1, 1992).
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remove the exemption completely. 1'
An exemption to the for-profit
sector on appropriate products would be a quick but illogical solution to
the complaints of unfair competition that have been lodged by that
1 49
sector.

148. North Dakota is currently considering an all-out attack on existing
treatment of nonprofits: a repeal of almost all sales tax exemptions for charitable,
educational, and religious non profits, as well as a sales tax on services. N.D. H.R.
1330 (1993); see North Dakota Considers Tax on Services; Repeal of Charitable
Sales Tax Exemptions, STATE TAx TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter/Spring 1993,
at 7. In a similar action, Alabama's state house of representatives is considering
repealing all sales tax exemptions on charitable sales. Ala. H.R. 245 (1992); see
House Considers Sales Tax Exemption Repeal, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Winter 1992, at 2. Additionally, the Nevada Attorney General declared
that a 1959 opinion of the same office wrongly interpreted Nevada's tax statute
when it allowed sales tax exemptions to charitable nonprofits on sales and
purchases. Now, the Attorney General has found that only purchases are
exempt. This finding will not be applied retroactively. Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. No.
92-7, [1 Nev.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 200-788 (July 22, 1992); see Attorney General
Reinterprets Charitable Sales Tax Exemption, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR
NONPROFITS, Fall 1992, at 5.
149. Several decisions refused to extend exemptions, e.g., rejecting the right
of churches to sell Bibles tax-free. In a South Carolina case, Thayer v. Tax
Comm'n, 413 S.E.2d 810 (S.C. 1992), a marketing company challenged the right of
churches to sell Bibles tax-free. The marketing company hoped to receive the
same exemption on its sales. Id. at 813. In South Carolina, religious publications
had been exempt since 1951, when the sales tax was implemented. However, the
court found instead that the sale of Bibles should be taxed: "[Any subsidy
benefitting religious organizations must result from the natural inclusion of
religion within the perimeter of a broad circle of nonsectarian groups also
benefitting from the subsidy." Id. at 814. The marketing company still had to
charge the sales tax on its sales. Id. at 815. The loss of the exemption will gain the
state approximately $300,000 in 1993, the commission estimated. News Release,
South Carolina Tax Commission, [1 S.C.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 200-508 (1992); S.C.
Information Letter 92-8, S.C. Tax Comm., [1 S.C.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH)
200-515
(1992). A parallel ruling was made by the U.S. Court of Appeals in North
Carolina, where three members of non-Christian faiths who had paid sales tax on
their respective sacred books challenged North Carolina's exemption on the
Holy Bible. Finlator v. Powers, 902 F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990). The court found that
the exemption violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because it discriminated against non-Christians. Additionally, the court found
that the application of the exemption required the government to inspect the
exempt matter, which violates the Free Press Clause. Id. at 1163. See [2 N.C.] St.
Tax. Rep. (CCH)
201-703 (1990). A similar ruling of the New York State
Department of Taxation found that Bibles are not specifically exempted. See
Bible Sales Taxable in New York, STATE TAX TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, Summer
1991, at 6.
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But vertical equity may be regarded as a more important
consideration, especially when one recalls that the sales tax shifts
toward the final consumer. This particular fact argues for granting an
exemption to for-profits who serve the same presumably needy
community as the nonprofit. But an approach to nonprofits' sales
taxation in terms of horizontal equity and efficiency of distribution leads
one to conclude that the exemption should be eliminated rather than
extended. Is° Again, the issue is a delicate one and is subject to a great
deal of debate. Some authors, however, point out the interdependence
between horizontal and vertical equity, insofar as horizontal equity
"demands equal treatment only when there is no legitimate basis for
inequality."'51
Academics have long discussed whether states should rely on
exemptions or credits. Exemptions appear much less efficient for reducing
regressivity because they relate to price stability, but offer the certainty
of tax relief, especially when they are stipulated for application to
specific products.5 2 The positive externality, namely certainty of tax
relief, is skewed in part with respect to sales tax exemptions on
purchased goods and sales in furtherance of the nonprofit purpose. It
appears that such exemptions might skew the market in favor of third
parties, who would receive more property, sales tax free. These
exemptions might also lead the consumer to choose to do business with a
nonprofit rather than with a for-profit firm. To the extent that the
charitable purpose is not well-defined and that the definition of
150. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 110-11. In 1990, Virginia refused to exempt a
nonprofit that sold Christmas trees during the Christmas season from the tax on
its sales, explaining that it "act[ed] as a competitor with other business[es] which
are required to collect tax." Ruling of Comm. P.D. 90-39 (Mar. 19, 1990); see [2 Va.]
St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 201-860 (1990). Normally, sales held three or fewer times a
year would be exempt, but this sale continued for a month. Given that it did
compete with other businesses, the commissioner found the nonprofit liable. Id.
Similarly, Virginia also ruled that a nonprofit preschool would not be exempt
from tax on sales if it operated more than three fundraisers per year. Ruling of
Commissioner P.D. 91-23 (Mar. 4, 1991); see [2 Va.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 201-951
(1991). In 1992, these rulings were reaffirmed. Ruling of Commissioner P.D. 92-91
(June 5, 1992); see [2 Va.] St. Tax. Rep. (CCH) 202-153 (1992). On the other hand,
in Maine, where nonprofits could only hold sales eight days out of the year, the
legislature passed an amendment allowing unlimited sales as long as the
organization holds its sales in bazaars, rummage sales, and picnics. See
Legislature Redefines "Casual Sale," STATE TAx TRENDS FOR NONPROFITS,
Summer 1990, at 7.
151. Kaplow, supra note 36, at 149.
152. Steven D. Gold, Simplifying the Sales Tax: Credits or Exemptions?, in
SALES TAXATION,,CRrrICAL ISSUES INPoLIcY A DMINISTRATION, supra note 145, at 157,
159-60.
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unrelated business is therefore unclear, sales tax exemptions can have a
distortionary effect that may at times compensate for inefficiency within
the sector. While the sector can generate business by its reputation and
by the general public perception that it is less likely to cheat the
consumer, the production of goods and services remains inefficient within
the sector. This loss is partially recouped by a transfer payment in the
form of the sales tax exemption. The second-best effects appear unclear.
Yet, wholesale exemptions for nonprofits from sales taxes both as
53
purchasers and as sellers should be reconsidered.
C. Tax on Services
Taxation of purchases and sales of tangible goods by nonprofit
organizations is a complicated enough issue, but the question of taxing
services presents a new set of problems. The fourth tax recommendation
by the Union Institute is as follows: "Governments should exempt
nonprofit organizations from taxes on services."''A
In the 1980's the most significant trend in state sales tax policies was
the effort to include services in the tax base. 55 Because this trend is
likely to continue in the next few years, specialists have focused their
attention on the theoretical and practical issues related to the
desirability and applicability of sales taxation of services. Nonprofit
exemption has been analyzed only sporadically, and must be regarded in
the light of general considerations of sales taxation and nonprofit theory.
Virtually all nonprofits, and particularly commercial nonprofits are
producers of services; they are nearly nonexistent in the industrial sector
of the economy. There are three reasons for this phenomenon. First,
specifying or evaluating services is inherently difficult. Nonprofits
rather than government are therefore entrusted with the responsibility
of providing the services. The second reason nonprofits do not exist in the
industrial sector may properly be deemed a matter of trust. Because the
services provided by nonprofits are often personal, but benefit a second
individual or group of individuals rather than the individual who paid
for the service, the person who paid must trust that the other person is
receiving that which was intended. The third reason centers around the
idea that the production of services is often labor-intensive. For
nonprofits, which suffer from a lack of capital, the service sector becomes
153. The question is of great interest to for-profit organizations that feel
threatened by nonprofit commercial activity. See John J. Motley III, Stop Unfair
Competition from Nonprofits, 4 SMALLBUS. REP. 27 (1989); see also Comptroller of
Public Accounts, Hearing No. 24,625, [1988-1990 Transfer Binder] Tex. Tax Rep.
(CCH) 401-085 (July 20,1989).
154. KOCH, supra note 2, at 91 (Recommendation 49).
155. Mikesell & Hamilton, supra note 145, at 31.
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the most viable market. 5 6 Again, it is this nondistribution of profits
constraint that limits raising capital in the nonprofit sector and prevents
nonprofits from acquiring the ability to sell equity shares. Therefore,
nonprofits must rely 57
instead primarily upon donations, retained earnings,
and debt for capital.
With the spread of "commercial" nonprofits, which are neither
donatively supported nor are they considered clubs, the sale of personal
services as the primary activity for bringing in income and, in some cases,
serves a fiduciary role. Nonetheless, in other cases these nonprofits serve
a function that could be served just as well by for-profit firms.'5 8 For
example, seventy-five percent of all general hospitals have been
established as nonprofit institutions yet hospitals provide fee-forservices to the public with little or no role in subsidizing its service to the
poverty sector. 9 In fact, nonprofit hospitals receive over ninety-five
percent of their revenues from payment for services rendered 60 Many
theoreticians agree with John Due's position that, "Acquisition of
services by households constitutes consumption expenditure in the same
fashion as the purchase of commodities; there is no basic
difference
61
between the two that warrants different tax treatment."'
Inclusion of services in the base of sales tax would mean a movement
towards a complete consumption tax structure. Economists have argued
that a general consumption base is more acceptable than a tax levied on a
subset, such as limiting the tax specifically to goods, for achieving
horizontal and vertical equity. Another major advantage would be the
ability to structure a tax system which minimizes the price distortions
that arise when one item, such as a good, is taxed and another close
substitute, such as a corresponding service, is not taxed. For example,
156. Hansmann, supra note 47, at 835.
157. Id. at 877.

158. For example, in 1991, the Louisiana Supreme Court refused to exempt a
laundry service set up by several nonprofit hospitals. Associated Hosp. Servs.,
Inc. v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 588 So. 2d 356 (La. 1991). The
laundry served the hospitals, but laundry service sales are taxable in Louisiana
law, and there is no statutory exemption for them. The hospitals claimed that the
laundry was a subsidiary of their operations, but the Louisiana Supreme Court
disagreed. Id. at 357. "In light of the fact that transactions between commonly
owned legal entities are an everyday commercial reality, we cannot assume that
the legislature meant, but simply neglected, to provide an exemption for such
situations." Id.at 358.
159. Hansmann, supra note 47, at 813.
160. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 162.
161. Walter Hellerstein, Sales Taxation of Services: An Overview of the
Critical Issues, in SALES T AXATION, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICY A DMINISTRATION,

supra note 145, at 42.
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usually the purchase of a new refrigerator is subject to tax, but repair of
an existing refrigerator is not. Thus, demand will be distorted toward the
service. However, historical and social reasons may partially explain
why a tax on services cannot be implemented. The distortion described
above, in which service on a refrigerator is free from tax, provides one
example: the rich buy a new refrigerator; the poor contract to have their
refrigerator fixed. A tax on service, therefore, may be perceived as
62
regressive.1

Welfare losses from tax distortions have been known to grow more
than proportionately to the tax rate. Thus, on the one hand, greater
well-being will result if rates are kept low. For a certain amount of
revenue, this result can be achieved by using a broader tax base. Many
specialists argue that a broader sales tax base would increase elasticity
of the tax. 163 On the other hand, some authors argue that the more

remote a service from the tangible good with which it is delivered, the
purer it is and therefore pure services have a "vanishing nature" which
should not be subjected to sales taxation. 64
With business purchases, the approaches are more uniform. One of
the principal concerns raised by extension of the sales tax to services
relates to the possibility that it will create additional pyramiding of
the sales tax because of its application to services purchased by
businesses.' 6 Frequently concern arises that many services are consumed
primarily by business and that broadening of the base will at least
inadvertently be a movement toward greater business taxation rather
than toward a larger consumption base.166 The problem is similar to the
case of sales taxation of goods, but is more complex due to the specific
nature of services.
Under traditional sales taxation of tangible personal property,
pyramiding problems are solved in part by exemption of sales for resale,
which is the most widespread and significant area of exclusions for the
retail sales tax.

67

Without a broader notion of sale for resale than most

162. John P. James, Sales Tax on Services: A Tax Administrator's Perspective,
CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 145, at

in SALES TAXATION,

69.
163. William F. Fox, Sales Taxation of Services: Has Its Time Come?, in SALES
TAXATION, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICY ADMINISTRATION, supra note

145, at 53.
164. Laird Graeser & Allen Maury, Sales Tax on Services: State Trends, in
SALES TAXATION, CRITICAL ISSUES IN POLICY ADMINISTRATION, supra note 145, at 80.
165. Old practice indicates this concern. See MOAK & COWAN, supra note 142,
at 57.

166. Fox, supra note 163, at 51.
167. M OAK &CowAN, supra note 142, at 57.
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legislation currently incorporates, however, the sales tax on services
would not resemble a retail sales tax.166
In a related issue, service taxation is also complicated by
considerations of vertical equity. States often address regressivity issues
by adjustments through exemptions to their tax base. 169 In fact, given the
diversity of services, the main issue might be not whether to tax services
in general, but whether to tax specific services. A persuasive case can be
made for broadening the sales tax base to include certain services and an
equally persuasive case can be made for exempting another set of services.
Other numerous services fall in the middle, and analysts will likely
disagree about whether these should be taxed. 170 This controversy is
related to the argument that a tax on services means substantial
administrative and compliance consequences. 171 In order to ensure both
efficiency and equity, states would be compelled to define very carefully,
and in accordance with their legal and financial means of ensuring
compliance, which services should be taxed and which services should be
exempt.
Regarding the issue of nonprofit taxation on service purchases in
relation to general considerations of charitability, the same conclusions
drawn in reference to business purchases of services should be used to
decide any action. 72 As for sales of services, which constitute a
representative part of nonprofits' activities, charitability seems a
relevant argument for exemption.73
V. THE QUESTION OF COMPETITION AND FAIRNESS
A. Competition in the Marketplace
Nonprofits have always been the object of complaints from the
commercial sector, especially when the organizations compete in the
marketplace. While tax-exempt status gives nonprofit organizations
certain advantages, it also exacts certain costs, such as limitations on the
generation and distribution of profit. Thus, quite conceivably, the
competition between nonprofit and for-profit organizations will increase
without posing a serious challenge to the tax-exempt status of the sector.
However, for this to occur, the sector will have to clarify the relative

168.
169.
170.
171.

Hellerstein, supra note 161, at 45.
Graeser & Maury, supra note 164, at 81.
Fox, supra note 163, at 53.
Id. at 54.

172. Mikesell, supra note 146, at 129.

173. Id.
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advantages and disadvantages of tax-exempt status and develop a
74
rationale for tax exemption that takes account of its changing role.
The federal government maintains a distinction between the income
that a nonprofit venture earns by virtue of its philanthropic activities
and that which it earns as a result of purely commercial activity
unrelated to its charitable purpose, known as "unrelated business
income." Net income for a nonprofit is taxable if it is the result of an
activity not "substantially" related to the purpose which makes the
organization exempt under the Internal Revenue Code. Also, the problem
of confining the benefit of a tax exemption to an organization's specific
exempt operations occurs when otherwise exempt property is used by a
private party. The private use gives rise to a property tax assessment
necessary to prevent "tax-exempt entities from indirectly gainingthrough leasing, for example-the benefits of both tax exemption and
the income tax credit."17 Unrelated business income is fully taxable, and
Weisbrod argues that this in itself provides some discouragement to
nonprofits from engaging in any activities that would generate it. 76 But
the determination of a profit's status as either related or unrelated is as
subjective as the determination of whether an organization itself should
be exempt.'7 This subjectivity gives rise to complaints from the for-profit
community that nonprofits can circumvent the regulations.
Small businesses increasingly complain that nonprofit concerns enjoy
advantages over for-profit ventures. Aside from the supposed ability to
avoid paying the tax on unrelated business income, nonprofits are accused
of charging much of their joint costs to for-profit enterprise, thereby
reducing, if not eliminating, taxable unrelated business income even
though the activities are actually quite profitable. Donor contributions
provide a joint subsidy for all activities including unrelated business,
such that contributions to "exempt" activities permit purchase of "jointuse" resources. 178

174. Lester M. Salamon, supra note 37, at 41; see also Lester M. Salamon, The
Invisible Partnership: Government and the Nonprofit Sector, 1 BELL ATLANTIC Q.
1 (1984); Lester M. Salamon, The Voluntary Sector and the Future of the Welfare
State, 18 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 11 (1989).
175. See Joan M. Youngman, The Role of Valuation in Determining
Ownership for Tax Purposes, 43 TAX LAW. 65, 103, n.185 (1989) (quoting STATE OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT R EDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (1984)).
176. WEISBROD, supra note 8, at 114.

177.

Id. at 114-15.

178. Id. at 126-27.
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One commentator maintains "that the tax on unrelated business
activity creates more unfairness than it can possibly prevent"'79 due to
the lack of economic evidence supporting the contentions that nonprofits
are able to undersell for-profits and that they benefit from their ability
to accumulate capital more quickly because of their exemption. The
existence of the tax on unrelated business income actually leads nonprofits
to concentrate their activity in areas that would normally not be as wellrepresented in the economy.1 80 Additionally, repeal of the unrelated
business income tax, which would permit nonprofits to enter any profitmaking industry, would reduce the pressure on for-profit firms in areas
that are "related" to the primary activities of nonprofits. While this
new freedom could increase the overall level of nonprofit entrepreneurial
activity, the diffusion of this activity throughout the economy reduces
the chance that an investor in a particular industry will suffer
substantial unanticipated losses from nonprofit entry.' 8' The empirical
literature is not sophisticated enough to ascertain the validity of these
82
claims.
Small business would counter these assertions with the argument that
nonprofits frequently find creative ways to provide commercial products
and services under the tax exempt regime; therefore, they are fighting to
maintain a tax on unrelated business income."' And, Congress has pointed
8
out that legislative difficulties could evolve if a repeal were enacted.' '
The behavior of nonprofits is difficult to predict in the market. This
inability to precisely calculate nonprofit performance usually sparks
discussion on economic modeling techniques that may lead to developing

179. SusAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, THE ECONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS
404-05 (1986).
180. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income
Taxation, in THE NONPROFIT ORGANIZATION: ESSENTIAL READINGS 91-108 (David L.
Gies et al. eds., 1990).
181. Id. at 404-05.
182. See Richard Steinberg, 'Unfair' Competition by Nonprofits and Tax
Policy, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 351-64 (1991) (The behavior of nonprofits is difficult to
predict in a market, but it is necessary in order to monitor the social benefit of the
nonprofits. The article discusses economic modeling techniques that show
promise towards developing testable predictions about the behavior of
nonprofits, which can ultimately provide guidance in the design of truly
empirical studies.).
183. J. Motley, Stop Unfair Competition from Nonprofits, 4 SMALL BUS. REP.
26, 26-29 (1989).
184. Elizabeth Wehr, Revising Non-Profit Rules: A No-Win Undertaking, 47
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 1096-100 (1989).
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testable predictions about such behavior and to monitor their social
benefit. 1' s
B. State and Local Tax Incentives to Induce Location
In order to stimulate new or developing business, urban
revitalization,1 6 or to achieve specific distributional goals, state and
local governments use a large number of incentive policies vis-A-vis the
for-profit sector.'8 7 Tax incentives represent only a part of these policies.

The tax incentives analyzed in most studies are reductions, exemptions, or
credits for purposes of the corporate income tax, sales and use taxes, and
the property tax. These categories are sometimes grouped according to
their impact on particular business activities and expenses. 8 While
incentive effects of state and local taxation upon investment and job
creation can be easily identified conceptually)8 9 commentators find it far

more difficult to quantify them. 190

185. Steinberg, supra note 182, at 352.
186. For a discussion of the subject of incentives provided by local
governments for public improvements, see Stephen B. Friedman, Assessing
Public Incentives for Private Development, in SHAPING THE LOCAL ECONOMY,
CURRENT PERSPECTIVES ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Cheryl A. Farr ed., 1984).
187. THE URBAN INSTITUTE, DIRECTORY OF INCENTIVES FOR BUSINESS
INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT INTHE UNITED STATES-A STATE BY STATE GUIDE 9,
12, 41, 42 (1983).

188. Id. at 52, 53. Corporate income tax, sales and use taxes, ad valorem
property tax exemptions, deductions, credit, and special treatment are
reorganized into the following categories: job creation tax credit, investment tax
credit, property tax abatement, business inventory, goods in transit, research and
development, pollution control equipment, industrial machinery and equipment,
industrial fuels and raw- materials, energy and fuel conservation measures and
other.
189. Id. at 59-68.
190. Michael Keischnick, Taxes and Growth-Business Incentives and
Economic Development, in 11 STUD. DEVELOPMENT POL'Y 12, 15 (Michael Barker

ed., 1981). No estimation is possible for preferential assessments to land and
buildings used for commercial and industrial purposes given tacitly by many
localities. Gary C. Cornia et al., State-Local Fiscal Incentives and Economic
Development, in URBAN AND REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT SERIES No. 4, ACADEMY FOR
CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 4 (1978); Robert W. Wassmer, Taxes, Property Tax

Abatement, Expenditure, and the Composition of the Property Tax Base in
Communities within a Metropolitan Area, 83 NAT'LTAx ASS'N-TAXINST. AM. 132,
132 (1990). Wassmer discusses the granting of abatements and the effect it has
on local fiscal variables in communities within a metropolitan area. The author
develops and tests a market-based theory that considers the actions of both
communities and firms. The results address five questions: (1) Do local fiscal
(continued)

1993]

TAXES ON NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

Statistical studies have examined the relationship between state
and local taxation on business and the elasticity of investment and
employment, but only limited conclusions have been drawn. 191 However,
empirical research' 92 leads to several conclusions. 193 In spite of tax

incentives, most firms making new investments do not even consider
locating in any state other than their final choice. Indeed, most firms
making new investments in states with tax incentives are unaware that
these incentives even exist. In most industries, the general level of
business taxation has an undetectable effect on investment patterns, and
where an effect can be detected, it is quite small.
Given the very small impact of state tax incentives on the local
growth rate and on interstate location decisions, some academics contend
that states should "resist the temptation to cut business taxes in order to
stimulate development" and that states should take steps to reduce
interjurisdictional differences in tax rates so as to reduce
interjurisdictional tax competition. 94 Nonetheless, if in the case of
nonprofits, state and local tax incentives have an arguable impact upon
the market share of the nonprofit sector, 9 ' one would expect a negative
response to these incentives by for-profit business
variables, including property tax abatements, affect local property tax bases? (2)
Do local characteristics affect local property tax bases? (3) Why do communities
offer tax abatements? (4) What are abatement effects? (5) Do property tax
abatements work? Robert W. Wassmer, Property Tax Abatement and the
Simultaneous Determination of Local Fiscal Variables in a Metropolitan Area,

68 LAND ECON. 263,263 (1992) (noting that local firm property tax abatements in
metropolitan areas are offered to offset noncapitalized profit reducing
characteristics and are effective at increasing nonresidential property bases, but
at costs, such as decreased home values and increased local property tax rates,
that should not be ignored by policy makers).
191. See Keischnick, supra note 190, at 46-51.
192. See id. at 64-82 (analyzing empirical research undertaken in four areas,
based on survey, rough and econometric estimations and benefit-cost analysis of
the results).
193.
194.

Id. at 83.
ROGER J. VAUGHAN, STATE TAXATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 6-7

(1979).
195. Henry Hansmann, The Effect of Tax Exemption and Other Factors on
the Market Share of Nonprofit Versus For-Profit Firms, 40 NAT'L TAX J. 71, 71

(1987). This is a quantitative analysis of the way in which state and local tax
exemptions affect the growing share of the nonprofit sector in health care and
education at the state level, and in the largest city in the state. The conclusion is
that these exemptions significantly increase the market share of nonprofits vis-Avis their for-profit counterparts. Id. at 79. There are, however, different results at

(continued)
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The conclusions presented above appear paradoxical when related to
the nonprofit sector. These conclusions also shed new light on the
increasing complaints of for-profit business against state and local tax
incentives provided to charitable nonprofits, even after considering the
growing share of nonprofits in "profitable" activities.
In spite of theoretical justifications for removing the tax on the
unrelated business income of nonprofit organizations, the political
climate today actually supports the strict taxation of all such income of
nonprofits, with a'tightening of supposed loopholes that allow the firms
to "hide" income and take advantage of the system in other ways. For
instance, in 1990 one organization, the Business Coalition for Fair
Competition 96, proposed a radical revision in state legislation that
would forbid all state agencies, institutions of higher education, and
nonprofits from competing in markets occupied by private businesses.1 97 It
appears that politicians see this issue as a popular one so it is likely
that this sort of legislation will continue to appear.
the state and largest city level, which points out locational effects of the tax
exemptions. Id. at 80; see also Cyril F. Chang & Howard Tuckman, Do Higher
Property Tax Rates Increase the Market Share of Nonprofit Hospitals?, 43 NAT'L
TAX J. 175, 185 (1990) (noting that property tax exemptions increase the market
share of nonprofit hospitals, but using Probit analysis, reveals that while high
property tax rates will increase the probability that only one hospital operates in
a region, it does not add to the probability that the hospital will be a nonprofit
one). "Probit Analysis involves estimation of an equation to predict the presence
of a single hospital in a county because the dependent variable is whether a
county has a single hospital (1) or not (0), Probit analysis is used to estimate the
contribution of each independent variable to the probability of a county having
one hospital." Id. at 182.
196. The Business. Coalition for Fair Competition ("BCFC") was formed in
1983. It is a coalition of trade associations that argue that they have suffered
from competition with nonprofits and state agencies. Business Group Proposes
Barring Nonprofits From Competition, STATE TAXTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS,
Summer 1990, at 1.
197. The proposal is based on an Arizona law that regulates competition by
state agencies, community colleges, and universities. Id. at 3. The legislation,
known as the "Model State Unfair Competition Bill," will allow for some
exclusions: nonprofits may remain active if specific state statutes allow it; they
may continue activities that are not regularly carried on in the private sector; and
they may continue their commercial activity if no private vendor can accomplish
the same task. Business Coalition Update, STATE TAX TRENDs FOR NONPROFITS,
Fall 1990, at 1, 3. The bill will create a Private Enterprise Review Commission
("PERC") having broad powers. Private businesses can appeal to the
commission, and if the PERC determines that a nonprofit is behaving
improperly, it can compel the nonprofit to stop its activity or ultimately revoke
the nonprofit's tax exemption. Id. at 3, 4.
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In more specific rulings, states and municipalities have been
provoked by the arguments of small businesses to differentiate strictly
between related and unrelated income. Recently, for example, local

governments, at the prompting of for-profit health clubs, challenged on

three occasions the exemptions given to YMCA's. 198
Connecticut's
legislature proposed a bill to tax the unrelated business income of
nonprofits, but, it is one of a few states that still does not tax this

particular income. 199

198. In December 1989, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a finding of the
Oregon Department of Revenue that two out of ten Portland YMCA's did not
qualify for a property tax exemption because they did not meet the definition of
charity: only eight percent of the membership was on scholarship. Young Men's
Christian Ass'n of Columbia-Willamette v. Department of Revenue, 784 P.2d
1086, 1091 (Or. 1989). The court also found that each YMCA had to qualify
separately for exemption. Id. at 1092. In March 1992, however, the Oregon
Department of Revenue reinstated the exemption for the two YMCA's because
they had changed their programming to include more community, family, and
youth services. In re YMCA Columbia-Willamette, No. 90-1523 (Or. Dept. of Rev.
March 23, 1992), aff'd, 849 P.2d 567 (Or. Ct. App. 1993). In the second case, forprofit health clubs challenged the exemption given to the Oakland, California
YMCA. Clubs of Cal. for Fair Competition v. Kroger, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 247 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1992). The California Court of Appeals found that the club deserved the
exemption because of the broad range of services it provided to the community
and in spite of the fact that its adult fitness operations were not available to a
large segment of the population that could not afford the fee. Id. at 254. In the
third case, a lower court ruling that the Pittsburgh YMCA was subject to tax was
overturned. Pittsburgh v. Board of Property Assessment, 564 A.2d 1026, 1031 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1989). Here the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court found that the
YMCA needed to operate a fitness facility in order to finance its other activities,
which were considered more salutary to the community. Id. The fact that these
cases all deal with YMCA's reflects the fact that the Y has begun to intrude on the
for-profit fitness industry, angering that sector and prompting the inquiries.
199. Conn. H.R. No. 465; see Connecticut to Tax Unrelated Business Income,
STATE TAxTRENDS FOR NONPROFITS, SPRING 1992, at 2. By contrast, the Indiana

Code § 6-2.1-3-20(a) exempts gross income for certain § 501(c)(3) organizations.
Section (a) states:
[Giross income received by an (1) institution; (2) trust; (3) group; (4)
united fund; (5) affiliated agency of a united fund; (6) not-for-profit
corporation; (7) cemetery association; or (8) organization; that is
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific,
literary, educational, or civic purposes is exempt from gross income tax
if no part of the gross income is used for the private benefit or gain of
any member, trustee, shareholder, employee or associate of the
taxpayer. For purposes of this section, the term "private benefit or gain"
(continued)
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VI. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The Union Institute's final recommendation states the following:
"State governments should provide technical assistance to nonprofit
organizations, their accountants,
and their lawyers to insure compliance
20

with the tax code regulations."
This proposed assistance may be justified with respect to market
theories such as the Fixed Pie Theory which suggests that there exists a
relatively stable set of collective functions to be performed; the larger
the portion of our social business undertaken by government, the less that
remains for the independent sector. 20 1 Consequently, voluntary
associations and the state "often have functioned and do function as
mutually competitive forces,"

2 °2

because the government has been doing

more and more of its business through private organizations, many of
them not-for-profit. 23 The need for governmental provision of technical
advice to the nonprofit sector works against the dislocation of the market
such that the government and the voluntary sector will continue to be
partners rather than adversaries, a necessity for a more efficient market
system. 20 4 Furthermore, it is proposed that nonprofit firms serve as
private sector providers of public goods. Nonprofit firms tend to arise

where, owing to heterogeneity of demand, governments provide public

does not include reasonable compensation paid to an employee for
work or services actually performed.
IND. CODE § 6-2.1-3-20(a)(19) (1994). Courts have applied a strict constructionist
view to interpret the statute, holding that "tax laws in general are strictly
construed against the state, but all exemption statutes must be strictly construed
in favor of tax and against the one seeking the exemption." State v. Bethel
Sanitarium, Inc., 332 N.E.2d 808, 810-11 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975) (in response to IND.
CODE § 6-2.1-3-22); Storen v. Jasper County Farm Bureau Co-op Ass'n, 2 N.E.2d
432 (id. Ct. App. 1936).
200. KOCH, supra note 2, at 95 (Recommendation 50).
201. The fixed pie theory states that there are only so many people that take
on the role of providing collective services in a society. See Paul DiMaggio,
Nonprofit Theories of the Independent Sector in INDEPENDENT SECTOR,
WORKING PAPERS FOR SPRING RESEARCH FORUM SINCE THE FILER COMMISSION

101,

104(1983).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 109.

204. KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION:
ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OURTIME (1957).
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goods at a level that is below the desired level of many individuals.
Nonprofit firms arise to fill the remaining unsatisfied demand. 2 5
The interaction of the voluntary, nonprofit, private sector, publicinterest organizations and institutions with government and business can
lead to a confusion of roles. Any of the three sectors can be compromised
by borrowing too many of the core values of the other. Some overlap is
necessary, as well as desirable, but too much leads to an essential
compromise of purpose. In effect, the technical assistance also provides a
means of regulation in the nonprofit sector such that, again, the nonprofit
sector will function most effectively and efficiently, in turn benefiting all
2
sectors of the community. 0
The recommendation for technical assistance also makes sense from a
revenue standpoint. If there is no real correspondence with non-profits
regarding what is required of them, municipal and state governments
could lose large amounts of revenue from non-profits skirting around the
rules. The technical assistance gives the government the ability to
regulate the non-profits, in order to minimize loss of income. In the laws
of the State of New York, for example, there were 130 exemption
provisions in 1982, sixty percent of which give full exemptions for an
assumed value of $100 billion. Within these 130 exemptions, subsets were
created by multiple provisions which expand the eligibility under these
laws. The laws have a large amount of overlap, such as exemptions for
"charitable purposes" and also for "benevolent purposes," which
sometimes allow organizations to obtain exemption on property that
should be taxed. 2°7 The point, however, is that the well-advised knowhow to navigate the laws and regulations, leaving those without good
advice or long experience to suffer.
CONCLUSION
The Nonprofit Policy Agenda has provided a valuable set of specific
recommendations for improving the relationship with respect to taxes
between government and the nonprofit sect6r.
While these
recommendations are not free of problems and complications, they serve
205. Burton A. Weisbrod, Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit
Sector in a Three-Sector Economy, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY, AND ECONOMIC
THEORY, at 190-91 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975).
206. Robert Payton, Philanthropic Values, in INDEPENDENT SECTOR, WORKING
PAPERS FOR SPRING RESEARCH FORUM: SINCE THE FILER COMMISSION, supra note

201, at 41.
207. See generally PETER SWORDS, CHARITABLE REALPROPERTY TAx EXEMPTIONS
IN NEW YORK STATE (1981) (examining New York's real property tax exemption to
nonprofits).
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as a viable starting point for discussion on the issue of nonprofit taxation
at the state and local level.
The recommendations of the institute are logical; they offer practical
suggestions towards a more efficient and revenue-conscious tax system
regarding nonprofits. The Institute, however, has not questioned the
The Institute's
nature of taxation of the nonprofit sector.
recommendations do not address the rapid growth of commercial
nonprofits, which flout traditional definitions of the relationship
between nonprofits and government. For example, in Recommendation 48,
the Institute suggests that "exempt purpose" should be the measure of
whether a nonprofit receives a sales tax exemption. Yet the exempt
purpose of many commercial nonprofits does not remotely support or
replace government policy initiatives. Thus, Recommendation 48 is too
favorable to the nonprofits. New initiatives in the realm of state and
local tax policy toward nonprofits should reflect the strict maintenance
of the distinction between charitable and commercial nonprofits, instead
of focusing on the distinction between exempt purpose and unrelated
activity.
The Institute recommendations are valuable but not likely to relax
the inherent tension in government-nonprofit relations. This tension
exists due to budget shortfalls, highlighting the fact that exemptions
usually given to nonprofits reduce revenues available to states and
localities. In other words, governments need revenues, and the many
nonprofits that do not provide social services can provide those revenues
if their exemptions are more thoroughly evaluated.
The Union Institute's first recommendation regarding taxation
suggests that states adopt consistent rules for the determination of
charitableness for exemption purposes. While laudable for its intent to
simplify and clarify state approaches to charitability, the
recommendation is neither clear nor easy to apply. One must assume that
the Institute suggests consistency among states, since that is where much
of the inconsistency lies. However, consistency would be nearly
impossible to attain given the current range of rules as well as the
historical traditions that often underlie those rules. Ultimately,
consistency might clarify the situation of the multistate nonprofit, but
would not lead to a solution to the budgetary crisis underlying current
reform efforts.
The Institute's second taxation recommendation encourages local
governments only to collect user fees where the service involved is
measurable and of direct benefit to the nonprofit; localities should not use
these fees simply to raise money. This recommendation is linked to the
question of property tax reform, because governments usually charge user
fees to replace revenue lost to property tax exemptions. Localities have
most often chosen to charge fees to the wealthiest organizations, often
hospitals, because these institutions appear most likely and able to pay.
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Such an approach clearly flies in the face of the Institute's
recommendation. A more complicated, yet more effective, strategy would
be to reassess the pattern of exemption so that it reflects the
charitable/commercial dichotomy. Thus, local governments would be
able to maintain their support for those nonprofits that replace or
complement government services without withdrawing that support by
assessing user fees.
The Union Institute's Recommendations 48 and 49 relate directly to
the sales tax, suggesting that nonprofits be exempted from paying taxes
on sales and purchases, including services, unless those taxes fall on items
or services outside of the organizations' exempt purpose. Once again, the
Institute utilizes the "exempt purpose" distinction, while the more
relevant distinction might be between charitable and commercial
organizations. When granting or re-evaluating exemptions, states and
localities should presume against granting such exemptions. 2 8 Generally,
the Institute's goal of simplifying the structure of exemptions is laudable,
but perhaps it should be reversed. Instead of a blanket exemption,
government should establish the opposite standard. Exemptions would
be withheld and only granted upon a thorough review.
Finally, the Institute's last recommendation dealing with technical
assistance is useful. The recommendation is especially appropriate
because the taxation system for nonprofit organizations remains complex.
By suggesting that "exempt purpose" act as the determinant of
whether an organization will be taxed or exempted, the Union Institute
proposes to treat the current system of exemptions as sacrosanct. A
similarly revenue-conscious, and more just, alternative would be to
discriminate between types of nonprofits rather than between purposes,
since the latter measure does not take social role into account. In other
words, government should place discriminatory standards for the
behavior of nonprofits before the simplification of the process of
exemption, if it wishes to reform the system in such a way as to maximize
revenues while maintaining the traditional partnership between
government and the charitable, nonprofit sector.
With the application of the Union Institute's recommendations, local
and state taxation of nonprofits would be simplified significantly.
However, the recommendations would be difficult to apply, and in the
view of this writer, they do not represent the most advisable way to
proceed. Conceding that any reform of the taxation of nonprofits will be
complex, a reform with greater discrimination would be more effective in
streamlining the system and alleviating the budgetary difficulties for
states and localities. The Union Institute advocates consistency and
simplicity, especially regarding Recommendations 46 and 48. Yet, a more
208. See MIKESELL, supra note 100, at 269-70.
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detailed treatment of nonprofits which evaluates the entity's social
contribution rather than their Internal Revenue Code exemption status
may better represent the traditional relationship of government and the
nonprofit sector.

